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ABSTRACT 
In the face of the Nixon-Reagan counterrevolution against liberal decisions of the Warren 
Court, some liberal judges and legal commentators have called for an increased reliance on state 
courts for the protection of civil rights and civil liberties. To gauge how well state courts and 
legislatures protected civil rights in the nineteenth century, I examined twenty school integration 
cases and numerous legislative and state constitutional convention actions in Louisiana and Kansas 
from 1868 through 1903. 
Contrary to what Raoul Berger and others have asserted, black integrationists had many 
allies in the mainstream of the Republican party in the late 19th century. Not only did they pass 
laws prohibiting the exclusion of children from any school because of race, color, or previous 
condition of servitude, but they represented black plaintiffs in numerous school integration cases, 
most of which have previously been unknown to or at least little noticed by scholars. At least one 
judge ruled segregation contrary to the Fourteenth Amendment, while another came close to doing 
so. The arguments of lawyers, legislators, and black petitioners to legislative bodies were all 
similar and often quite sophisticated. In particular, the unpublished briefs in three Louisiana cases 
made clear how intermixed contentions based on state and national constitutions were. If the state 
constitution and laws created a right and the national constitution and laws prohibited unequal 
enjoyment of state-created rights, then legal inequities violated rights on both governmental levels 
simultaneously. 
From 1877 on in Louisiana, and from 1903 on in Kansas, blacks lost the strong protection 
against unequal schools that they had enjoyed, at least de jure, earlier. Whether the reversals 
reflected shifts in white public opinion is unclear, for it was not the white populus that made the 
changes, but a new, younger set of white racist judges. Their ability to reverse or bypass earlier 
liberal judicial decisions or legal provisions demonstrates how fragile rights can be in the several 
states and undermines the empirical foundations of what might be called "the new states' rights." 
I. PROLOGUE: "ABSOLUTELY EQUAL BEFORE THE LAW" 
J. Morgan Kousser 
California Institute of Technology 
Pasadena, California 91 125 
Robert H. Isabelle faced a complicated legal situation when he tried to get his son William 
admitted to a school in his ward of New Orleans in 1870.1 Under articles 13  and 1 35 of the 
Louisiana Constitution of 1868, every public facility, specifically including schools, was declared 
open to every person regardless of race.2 Fearing that courts might rule the constitutional guarantee 
not self-executing, the radical Republican legislature of 1869, of which Isabelle was a leading 
member, wrote the integration provision into the state education law.3 Still, the 
Democratic-dominated Orleans Parish school board refused to grant "colored" children - Isabelle 
was lighter in complexion than many people who were considered "white" - the permits necessary 
to admit them to the "white" schools.4 The legislature in 1870 therefore acted to circumvent the 
board by authorizing the state superintendent of schools, Thomas W. Conway, a white Radical 
ca!Jletbagger, to appoint new school boards for each ward of Orleans parish which would supersede 
the parish board.5 When Conway packed the ward boards with integrationists, as the legislators had
no doubt intended,6 the teachers still refused to admit Isabelle's child, preferring to obey the parish 
board segregationists, rather than the ward board integrationists. 7 Isabelle sued. 
The petty legal point immediately at issue in Judge Henry C. Dibble's Eighth District court 
on Nov. 21, 1870 was which boards had legal control of the money that the state had allocated to 
schools. Behind this, however, lay the question of integration. Isabelle's lawyer could have argued 
the case purely on the basis of the 1 870 law, the grounds on which the wily Judge Dibble decided 
it, or he could have relied on the nondiscrimination section of the 1 869 law, or he could have 
harkened back to section 135 of the state constitution, or he could have pled the Equal Protection 
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, or like the usual risk-averse attorney, he could have argued 
all of these. But in his brief, the lawyer, John B. Howard, did not cite any specific provisions of 
state or national law at all. Instead he appealed to the general nature of "republican government." 
"That universal consent, so essential to the safety of a republic," Howard proclaimed, "requires -
1st. That the laws of a public character should be universal in their application; 2nd. That such 
laws should be framed and enacted so as to recognize, enforce and maintain the duties and rights of 
all inhabitants - in govemmen� in propef!Y, in person, in society, in morals and in education, and 
in whatever satisfies the wants of every one, without injury or trespass on the domain of any 
other.118 
Howard's short extant brief in this unreported state district court case was extreme in its 
refusal even to go through the formal mechanics of citing constitutional or statutory provisions, but 
it was typical of nineteenth century briefs and judicial opinions on school segregation in its lack of 
distinction between "legal" issues, on the one hand, and "legislative" or "policy" issues, on the 
other, as well as in its explicit grounding in the fundamental questions of what was "reasonable" for 
legislators or administrators to do and what rights each citizen had. Howard's two natural law 
arguments amounted, after all, to equality and protection - just the phrase that his fellow 
Republican John A. Bingham had recently written into the Fourteenth Amendment.9 But since the 
Isabelle case was never appealed - there was a substantial degree of school integration in New 
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Orleans from 1870 to 1 877, no doubt including William R. Isabelle, Robert's son, among its 
beneficiaries - and since Judge Dibble, an integration sympathizer who later became president of 
the reorganized Orleans parish school board, decided the issue narrowly, the Isabelle case did not 
become an integrationist, equal rights precedent in the state that two decades later produced Plessy 
v. F erguson.10
For a second, somewhat less obscure factual prelude to the discussion of school segregation 
law in the nineteenth century, let us take the Mississippi river and its tributaries north to Kansas, as 
many black folks from Louisiana did at the end of the 1 870s. In his opinion for the Kansas 
supreme court in the 1 8 8 1  case of Board of Education of Ottawa, Kansas v. Leslie Tinnon, Justice 
Daniel M. V alentine11 used the same type of sonorous language about equal rights that John 
Howard had several hundred miles down the Mississippi river in 1 870.12 Since some legal 
commentators, such as Herbert Hovcnkamp and Raoul Berger, have alleged that " . . .  the Radical 
Republicans did not want racial integration any more than southern whites did", 13 it is worth 
quoting Valentine's words at length: 
The tendency of the times is, and has been for several years [Justice Valentine 
remarked], to abolish all distinctions on account of race, or color, or previous condition of 
servitude, and to make all persons absolutely equal before the law . . . .  
. . . Is it not better for the grand aggregate of human society, as well as for individuals, 
that all children should mingle together and learn to know each other? At the common 
schools, where both sexes and all kinds of children mingle together, we have the great world in 
miniature; there they may learn human nature in all its phases, with all its emotions, passions 
and feelings, its loves and hates, its hopes and fears, its impulses and sensibilities; there they 
may learn the secret springs of human actions, and the attractions and repulsions, which lead 
with irresistible force to particular lines of conduct.14 But on the other hand, persons by 
isolation may become strangers even in their own country; and by being strangers, wi!l be of 
but little benefit either to themselves or to society. As a rule, people cannot afford to be 
ignorant of the society which surrounds them; and as all kinds of people must live together in 
the same society, it would seem to be better that all should be taught in the same schools . . . .  
. . . And what good reason can exist for separating two children, living in the same 
house, equally intelligent, and equally advanced in their studies, and sending one, because he 
or she is black, to a school house in a remote part of the city, past several school houses nearer 
his or her home, while the other child is permitted, because he or she is white, to go to a school 
within the distance of a block? No good reason can be given for such a thing . . .  .If the board 
has the power, because of race, to establish separate schools for children of African descent, 
then the board has the power to establish separate schools for persons of Irish descent or 
Gennan descent; and if it has the power, because of color, to establish separate schools for 
black children, then it has the power to establish separate schools for red-headed children and 
blondes.15 
Like Judge Dibble in New Orleans, Valentine rested his opinion, representing also the 
views of Chief Justice Albert H. Horton of the three-man state supreme court, fonnally on the 
narrowest possible grounds. He assumed, "for the purposes of this case", that neither the 
Fourteenth Amendment nor the Kansas constitution prohibited a school board from classifying 
students by race, and inquired only whether the Kansas legislature had authorized such a 
classification, and, if not, whether the board's general mandate to regulate schools included an 
inherent power to segregate.16 
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In a larger sense, however, Valentine's consideration of this last question opened up all the 
issues related to the reasonableness of segregation that courts discussed throughout the nineteenth 
century whenever they decided school or public accommodations segregation cases. From Roberts 
v. Boston to Plessy v. Ferguson and beyond courts asked two fundamental questions: First, was 
treating people of different races differently "reasonable" or merely "arbitrary"? Second, if racial 
distinctions were unreasonable, did judges, under the Fourteenth Amendment, state laws or 
constitutions, or natural law, have the power to disallow such actions or were they were bound to 
defer to legislative or administrative bodies?17 That contemporaries understood that Valentine's 
soaring rhetoric had these wider implications is shown by the vigorous dissent of future U.S. 
Supreme Court Justice David J. Brewer in the Tinnon case.18 Brewer, who earlier had presided as 
school superintendent and school board member over the segregated schools of Leavenworth, found 
a "suggestion" in Valentine's opinion that the Fourteenth Amendment prohibited segregation, and 
"dissent[ed] entirely" from that position. Moreover, even though he conceded that racial 
segregation "may be unreasonable," Brewer, whose career on the nation's highest court constituted 
a continual quest for judicial supremacy, insisted in Tinnon that the Kansas courts had to defer to 
the local board, because the board was "elected by the community" .19 
Since Justice Henry Billings Brown in Plessy tested the reasonableness of segregation 
under the Fourteenth Amendment by citing laws and state and lower federal court opinions on the 
subject, it should have been incumbent on him to distinguish or at least mention the majority 
opinion in Tinnon.w Ironically, Brown's finesse - he did not directly refer to Tinnon, other
pro-integration cases, or the numerous northern laws mandating integration in schools and public 
accommodations - would have been even more blatant had Valentine merely followed the opinion 
of Kansas district court judge Nelson T. Stephens in the first stage of the Tinnon case.21 Quoting 
plentifully from both the U. S. Supreme Court majority and minority opinions in Slaughter House, 
as well as from Justice William Strong's 1880 opinion in Strauder v. West Virginia and Justice 
David Davis's opinion in the 1873 case of Railroad Co. v. Brown, Stephens concluded that "it is 
evident to every mind" that the Fourteenth Amendment prohibited segregation.22 
II. NINETEENTH CENTURY LESSONS FOR THE NEW STATES' RIGHTS
Why bother about obscure cases, over a century old, one of them not even publicly printed? 
What possible relevance can they have to contemporary efforts to reinvigorate state courts as 
protectors of individual rights in the face of the Nixon-Reagan counterrevolution against the 
Warren Court?23 Their relevance, and that of the other cases from those two states that I will 
discuss in this paper, is three-fold: First, in each the lawyers, and, in Tinnon, the judges, discussed 
the broadest issues, exactly the same issues that judges always considered when they asked baldly 
whether the Fourteenth Amendment or natural law prohibited some regulation or classification 
There was [and is] no escaping such issues, and to phrase the inquiry in terms of state 
constitutions, laws, or traditions, instead of more abstractly or nationally, strikes me as artificial and 
disingenuous. 24 Second, in their laudable effort to follow the best judicial practice, liberal 
nineteenth century judges crafted their final opinions in formally narrow terms of state law, which 
greatly reduced the value of the decisions as precedents, even in their own states. When the state 
laws or constitutions changed, or when the issues were framed in formally larger terms, later 
lawyers and judges could more easily ignore, dismiss, or distinguish these rulings. By contrast, 
opinions in cases that upheld segregation logically had to consider the more abstract, national 
questions of whether racial classifications were against the Fourteenth Amendment or fundamental 
notions of equal rights. Thus, these latter, pro-segregation opinions, interpreted under the usual 
legal shorthand convention that cases "stand for" pithy principles, inevitably played a larger role in 
shaping equal protection law than the state-based, closely-focused, pro-integration decisions. 
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Analogous dangers may lurk in the sauve qui peut stance of current liberal states' righters. Third, 
even the clearest of state constitutional guarantees and the most expansive egalitarian judicial 
rhetoric provided fragile support for civil rights in the face of the violent counterrevolution in 
Louisiana and the subtler pressure-group machinations in the Kansas legislature. James Madison's 
commendation of national diversity as a protection of minority rights in Federalist number 10 is 
forgotten at our peril.25 As a citizen of the state that recalled Rose Bird and two other liberal 
justices of the state supreme court, I cannot ignore the comparative ease with which policy in the 
states can be reversed. 
In addition to seeking to avoid some unintended consequences of contemporary legal 
tactics, there are other, more "historical" reasons for recounting these tales. First, they refute or at 
least greatly complicate the pessimistic view, shared by some on the left and nearly everyone of an 
opposite policy orientation who have written on the subject, that white racial opinion in nineteenth 
century America was uniformly and deeply racist.26 Second, the analysis that proves this point 
expands the usual boundaries of constitutional history, which has been slow to follow the examples 
of Hurst, Horwitz, and others into social, economic, and non-"legal" political history, and to 
venture beyond the covers of printed books of cases.v Third, many published accounts of the 
history of school integration in these two states during the nineteenth century are either incomplete 
or incorrect and need revision. 28 Fourth, many of the brave, idealistic men and women who fought 
for racial justice then have been forgotten or unjustly maligned, while their opponents have often 
been celebrated or at least insufficiently pilloried.29 Both groups deserve more fitting notice. 
ill. THE LEGAL FRAMEWORK 
The laws, administrative acts, and state constitutional provisions on school integration in 
Louisiana and Kansas were more complex than historians have sometimes realized, and one cannot 
understand the judicial actions on the subject without first reviewing the actions of these (other) 
political bodies. 
A. From Exclusion to Integration to Segregation in Louisiana 
Blacks were taxed to support public schools in antebellum Louisiana, but prohibited from 
entering them. The relatively affluent community of gens de couleur in New Orleans was 
permitted to establish private academies and schools for black indigents, however, and Paul 
Trevigne, who later figured prominently in the school integration struggle, was a longtime teacher 
in an antebellum indigent school. 30 The first system of publicly supported schools for blacks in the 
state was established by the occupying Union Army during the Civil War. As its control was 
limited, the system it established was temporary and failed to reach many of the "country" parishes. 
Even so, New Orleans blacks made an attempt to integrate the existing schools, an effort which 
failed in the wartime confusion.31 
In a move to restore state control of education, the 1 864 constitutional convention, called 
by moderate white Unionists under Lincoln's wartime "ten percent" plan, first adopted a 
"conservative" plan providing that segregated public schools would be supported by racially 
segregated taxes-the taxes paid by whites would be used for white schools, and those relatively 
tiny taxes paid by blacks, for black schools. Reasoning that the numerous group of predominantly 
white Afro-Americans "could not be distinguished from the whites by facial features or color," 
some delegates (none of whom was "colored" under any such rule) proposed to define people with 
three-fourths or more white ancestry as "white" for school purposes. The convention rejected this 
"quadroon bill," 47-23, and they also voted down a proposal to integrate all persons 
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indiscriminately in the schools, 66-15.32 Under pressure from radicals outside the convention, the 
1864 delegates three weeks later removed all mention of race from the constitution (55-29), leaving 
the legislature to structure a public education system now open to all children between the ages of 6 
and 18.33 
With the collapse of the Confederacy, a radically racist Democratic government replaced 
the Unionists. Its state superintendent of schools, Robert M. Lusher, simply disregarded the state 
constitution, refusing to authorize any funds at all to be spent on what he termed "the mental 
training of an inferior race."34 The Congressional refusal to recognize this government of 
ex-rebels, the landslide Republican victory in the 1866 national elections, and the calling of a new 
constitutional convention in Louisiana, with the delegates to be elected by black as well as white 
voters, gave blacks a chance to reverse Lusher's patently unconstitutional policies. Presciently 
fearing that once established, a segregated system would be impossible to change, a group of black 
activists grouped around the radical New Orleans Tribune pushed simultaneously for an end to 
exclusion and for completely non-segregated institutions.35 In the 1868 constitutional convention, 
half of the delegates to which were considered black, the integrationists attained their goal. Among 
the whites voting in favor of integrated schools and public accomodations was Louisiana-born 
Simeon Belden, later state attorney general and subsequently a lawyer for blacks in three school 
integration suits. 36 
Despite the explicit ban on segregated schools in the 1868 constitution and in the 1869 
state law, schools in parishes outside New Orleans seem to have been almost entirely segregated.37 
The key was enforcement, which depended on the views of local school administrators, who were 
appointed by the state superintendent of schools, and on white public opinion, which was virtually a 
unit against school integration. Indeed, upper class whites were none too favorable to 
publicly-financed schooling at all. When Democrats violently "redeemed" the state in 1876, they 
did not explicitly require segregation by state law, though they did repeal the 1869 legal guarantee 
of no racial discrimination.38 Similarly, fearing intervention by the federal government, the 1879 
state constitutional convention delegates repealed Article 135 of the 1868 constitution, but did not 
make school segregation mandatory.39 Instead, they authorized the new state superintendent of 
education, Robert M. Lusher (again), to appoint new school boards that would carry out the 
discriminatory will of the legislature less formally.40 In New Orleans, the board resolved on July 9, 
1877, to segregate students beginning in the fall term.41 
B. From Exclusion to Segregation to Integration to Confusion in Kansas 
In the 1850s, Kansas was the national focal point of the slavery controversy. Ever since, 
Kansans have clashed over issues of race relations. Proslavery Missourians exploded into the 
territory after 1854, to be met with "Beecher's Bibles" from New England. "Bleeding Kansas" 
became not only a potent symbol of slave state aggression, but also an important ingredient in 
Kansans' creation myth. Its sanguinary epitome was John Brown, whose "Pottawatomie Massacre" 
took place in the same county as the later Tinnon case. In the 1870s, Kansas became the goal of the 
black "Exodusters." Even before the organized exodus, Kansas had the highest black percentage 
outside the former slave states. Overwhelmingly Republican from the late 1850s until the Populist 
revolt of the 1890s, the state followed a zig-zag course on racial legislation that no doubt perplexed 
contemporaries. It has certainly confused scholars since. Indeed, the shifts in the legal status of 
blacks in public education in the Jayhawk State were so frequent and dramatic that they can be 
followed only with a tabular guide, such as Table 1. 
[Table 1 about here ] 
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In 1855, the first tenitorial legislature, fraudently elected by proslavery Missourians, 
ba.'111ed the tenitory's few free blacks from the public schools altogether, as well as voting to 
prohibit further black immigration. Even the nascent Free State Party initially endorsed an 
all-white Kansas.42 By 1858, however, the power of the antislavery forces was secure enough that 
the legislature omitted a black exclusion clause in its education law.43 The next year, delegates to 
the convention that framed the constitution that Kansans would enjoy throughout the nineteenth 
century avoided all mention of race in the section on education, as Louisiana Unionists did in 1864. 
Although Democrats warned the Kansas convention's dominant free-state forces that the section 
would enable blacks to sue for admission into white schools, the majority refused to change it, and 
the delegates explicitly rejected attempts to exclude blacks from all schools and to require 
segregation.44 As Maine-born Republican Dr. J.J. Blunt of Anderson County prophesied: "We 
don't know what will be the peculiar views of the people of Kansas upon this subject before there 
will be a change of the organic law. There may be a progress made by which the prejudices which 
involve and surround this question of negroes or mulattoes to our common schools may be laid 
aside; and then the Legislature could provide for the education of persons of color. "45 
During the War, the legislature first mandated separate but equal across the state, then 
allowed the town of Marysville and the city of Leavenworth (the state's only "first class city" at the 
time) to allocate all taxes paid by whites to white schools, leaving only the pittance paid by refugee 
freedmen for black schools.46 At the close of the conflict, the legislature authorized localities that 
had too few blacks to make segregation feasible to admit them into the common schools. It is 
difficult to determine the effect of these laws. Leavenworth county, which by itself contained 47% 
of the state's black population in 1860, certainly had a separate black school by 1864, but many 
other black children probably went without public schooling, while others presumably entered the 
common schools. 
Under pressure from the state teachers' association, which had endorsed integration in 
1866, and the Radical Republican state school superintendent, Peter Mc Vicar, the 1867 legislature 
moved to guarantee blacks access to schooling, allowing localities to exercise their option on 
whether it would be segregated or not.47 After reenacting the 1861 equal advantage law, perhaps 
just as a reminder to school boards, the legislature explicitly authorized segregation in "second 
class" cities. On the session's last day, the members rushed through a bill levying a mandatory 
$100 a month fine on any district board that refused admission to "any children into the common 
schools," the fines to be allocated to a special fund to be spent by each county school 
superintendent for the education of the locked-out children. In small towns or rural areas, such a 
sum would pay for two teachers and a rented school room - a quite adequate school for blacks or 
whites by the standards of the time.48 
Despite annual pleas for integration from Superintendent Mc Vicar, the legislature from 
1868 to 1872 merely reaffirmed earlier laws permitting first and second class cities to establish 
segregated schools.49 In 1873, however, the Congressional struggle for a civil rights law spun off 
movements in several states (New York, California, and Pennsylvania, as well as Kansas) to pass 
state guarantees of non-discrimination in admissions to schools and other places of public 
accomodation. 50 Black Kansans from throughout the state lobbied the legislature and succeeded in 
getting a nearly unanimous repeal of segregation in second class cities and in convincing the lower 
house to mandate integration everywhere.51 The state senate failed to act on the bill. 
The next year, the black lobby succeeded. H.B. 1, a slightly rearranged version of the 1873 
H.B. 247, passed both houses overwhelmingly. Prohibiting school officials, as well as those in 
charge of businesses that served the public, from making "any distinction on account of race, color 
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or previous condition of servitude," and repealing all contrary laws or parts of laws, it clearly made 
it illegal to deny any Kansan entry into a common school because of race.s2 The parallel to articles 
13 and 135 of the 1868 Louisiana constitution and the subsequent statutes is clear and striking. 
Kansas followed Louisiana, at this time, on issues of civil rights. If litigation and practices in other 
states are a guide, then under such a law, districts could still maintain one or more "colored" 
schools.s3 This issue was apparently not litigated in Kansas. What they could not do was to 
exclude a black student who met the age, achievement, and neighborhood qualifications from any 
white school, nor could they force students into segregated schools by maintaining different, 
overlapping attendance zones for children of each race. This was, in effect, the practical definition 
of de jure school segregation in the nineteenth century, and it underlines the connection between 
non-exclusion and integration - a connection that has sometimes confused historians.s4 
When it codified the school laws in 1876, the legislature deleted all authority to operate 
segregated schools in Kansas cities. Far from an "error ... of oversight", as one historian alleged, or 
an event that occurred "for reasons that are not stated", as the lawyer who represented the state in 
Brown v. Board of Education before the U.S. Supreme Court concluded, the 1876 codification 
merely reaffirmed the doctrine in the state's 1874 civil rights law.ss 1n fact, the Senate Education 
Committee's draft of S.B. 202 had explicitly allowed segregation, but the Republicans on the floor, 
chastized by Samuel N. Wood, a reformer who supported every cause from abolition, through 
black and female suffrage, to the Greenback and Populist parties, amended the bill to omit all 
authorization of segregation. s6 The small minority of Democrats in the legislature race-baited in 
classic fashion, a representative from Coffeyville declaiming, for instance, that he "would not insult 
nor misrepresent his intelligent and respectable constituents by voting such an outrageous 
proposition as to have 'niggers' and white children educated together .... He was glad that the 
[R]epublicans were going to put themselves on record in favor of 'nigger' equality. The white 
people were paying all the taxes and they should be permitted to say how their children should be 
educated. "s7 
Three years later, the legislature reversed course again, authorizing racial separation in 
first-class cities in a bill passed near the two month session's end. Why the still overwhelmingly 
Republican body took this action is presently unclear, but two suggestions may be offered. First, 
such bills were generally drafted by and sent to committees composed of the representatives of the 
cities involved, and the legislature usually followed their lead.ss Second, legislative deference to 
local delegations was encouraged by the utter confusion that prevailed at the end of each fifty-day 
session. As a reporter for the Topeka Commonwealth noted, "It is almost impossible at the closing 
hours of the session to give a clear and succinct account of the proceedings. Bills pass in one 
house, are considered in the other, conference committees are appointed and so on. Hardly one of 
the members can tell you just the condition of a given bill. "s9 
And as blacks learned when they tried to repeal the 1879 act two years later, bedlam could 
kill a bill as well as pass it. S.B. 238, which would have negated the 1879 law, passed the Senate 
very late in the 1881 session, but was not considered in the House.60 The same fate awaited them 
when in 1889 blacks launched a more thoroughgoing campaign, spearheaded by the state's first 
black legislator, Alfred Fairfax, and complete with a petition drive and an active lobbying effort.61 
In that year, several bills providing for integration in first-class cities were proposed and then 
abandoned, in favor of an amendment to a more general education bill. That bill, however, was 
defeated at the last moment, apparently because of a disagreement not over integration, but over tax 
rates.62 From then until the mid-twentieth century, the best Kansas Afro-Americans could do was 
to block all attempts to expand segregation, except for a 1905 act allowing segregated high schools 
in Kansas City. 63 
IV. THE INTERDEPENDENCE OF NATIONALLY-AND STATE-BASED RIGHTS
AND THE FAILURE OF STATE PROTECTION 
A. Louisiana: Judicial Farces 
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Within two weeks of the ratification of the Radical state constitution, blacks filed the first 
New Orleans school integration case.64 Alderman Blanc Joubert, whose given name announced the 
tone of his skin, entered his daughter Cecile into a private school for white girls at the Convent of 
the Sacred Heart in January, 1868.65 During February, the school expelled her on grounds of 
"color". Retaining Alexander P. Field, a Kentucky-born white Unionist politician who had 
previously flirted with various factions of the Republican party and who became the state attorney­
general in 1873, Joubert charged that, as a publicly-licensed corporation, Sacred Heart could not 
discriminate between patrons on the ground of race.66 The defendants responded not by disputing 
the constitutional argument, but by denying that the three-teacher school had any legal affiliation 
with the Convent. Sixth district judge Guy Duplantier, a native white Republican who was later 
associated with Simeon Belden as counsel in Paul Trevigne's integration suit, accepted the 
teachers' contention, and dismissed the suit, which was not appealed, presumably because their 
control of the new government gave people of color other means of attaining their goals.67 With an 
administration friendly to integration, at least in New Orleans, there was no need for suits between 
1870 and 1876. 
Faced with widespread Democratic violence and intimidation in the last years of the 
Reconstruction regime, Louisiana Republicans sought the best deals they could get for themselves 
and their constituencies. 68 Most expected that the Grant and Hayes administrations (the latter 
seated with disputed Louisiana electoral votes) would preserve law and order. As that hope failed, 
some, such as former Lt. Gov. P.B.S. Pinchback, who was the son of a white Mississippi planter 
and his ex-slave common-law wife and the principal framer of the state's civil rights laws, had 
little choice but to accept the Democrats' public assurances that they would abide by the postwar 
national constitutional amendments.69 When it became clear that trusting in the vaunted honor of 
the southern upperclass was futile, blacks turned to the courts, only to see the same honorable men 
brazenly disregard laws that they initially feared to repeal, and then, when northern pressure 
receded further, renege on even separate but equal.70 
The first case was filed by Paul Trevigne-teacher, editor, and bilingual poet, who served 
on the Orleans parish school board from 1876 until the Redeemers replaced almost all the 
Republicans with White Leaguers in 1877.71 In September of that year, Trevigne, through his 
lawyers Belden and Duplantier, sought in the state district court to enjoin the parish school board 
from putting its July segregation resolution and the accompanying enabling regulations into effect 
when the schools opened, thereby barring Trevigne's son, also called Paul, from the common 
school that he had previously attended.72 Belden and Duplantier claimed that segregation doubly 
violated Trevigne 's privileges or immunities under the Fourteenth Amendment-as a citizen of the 
United States and of the state.73 As a national citizen, Trevigne had a fundamental right to be free 
of discrimination in public services on account of race. As a citizen of Louisiana, he was 
guaranteed by article 2 of the 1868 state constitution enjoyment of "the same civil, political, and 
public rights" as any other Louisianian, and by article 135, access to public schools without racial 
distinction.74 Egalitarian provisions of the state constitution, then, strengthened as well as 
complimented the federal guarantee, Trevigne's counsel asserted, and the two were intrinsically 
intertwined.75 The injury that gave Trevigne standing to sue, furthermore, expressed at the same 
time the fundamental national and state right that had been inflinged: Segregation by law, in the 
words of his petition, "tends to and does degrade ... petitioner and his son Paul Trevigne and the 
entire colored population of this city76 • • . •  [H]owever meritorious they may be, a distinction thus 
made detracts from their status as citizens and consigns them to the contempt of their fellow men 
and citizens of this community and elsewhere. "77 
With state constitutional provisions so clearly against them, city attorney Benjamin F. 
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Jonas78 and volunteer counsel EdgarH. Farrar79 quibbled over questions of remedy and standing.80 
The segregation resolution had already passed, so how could it be enjoined? But since it had not 
yet been put into effect, Trevigne had suffered no real, but only a prospective injury.81 Further, 
even if Trevigne had been injured, others might approve segregation, and enjoining it might 
trample on their rights. What gave Trevigne the right to speak for all people of color? As for the 
national and state constitutions, Jonas and Farrar paid them no more attention than their fellow 
White Leaguer, 6th district Judge Nicholas H. Rightor, did to Belden and Duplantier' s precise and 
detailed answer to the board lawyers' pettifoggery. 82 
Trevigne, Judge Rightor ruled, "cannot assume either the tasks or the prerogatives of a 
public functionary nor constitute himself the champion of any right but his own." Even if the 
remedy the former school board member requested were applied to the sub-district in which he 
resided, his petition would fail, for it did not specify that sub-district. If the law was as clear as 
Belden and Duplantier claimed, should the court presume that administrators would defy it by 
denying young Trevigne access to his neighborhood school? Adding insult to disingenuousness, 
Rightor closed his opinion with a rhetorical flourish: "Courts have a sufficiently difficult task in the 
effort to redress 'real and actual' rights, without multiplying their duties in the rectification of 
prospective injuries which may never be suffered and the vindication of future rights which may 
never be born. "83 
Trevigne appealed to the state supreme court, which delayed the case and finally issued an 
opinion, which it did not deign to publish, on January 20, 1879.84 Justice Alicibiades De Blanc's 
opinion was brief and cynical.85 Judge Rightor said Trevigne had come to court too early, before 
his son had been excluded. De Blanc said he came too late. Since segregation was now an 
accomplished fact, a mandamus directing the board to admit the boy, not an injunction restraining it 
from refusing to admit him, was the proper remedy, and Belden and Duplantier had not asked for a 
mandamus. Like Rightor, DeB!anc ignored the fact, strongly pressed by Trevigne's lawyers, that 
the wrong continued, just as he paid no attention to the increasing merger of notions of injunction 
and mandamus in 19th century law.86 No doubt as a prophylactic against such frivolous lawsuits, 
he assessed costs to the plaintiff. 
Three weeks after Judge Rightor's decision in Trevigne, but before the appeal to the state 
supreme court was entered, Belden filed two more state cases in the 6th District court, one of 
which, Harper v. Wickes, was subsequently dropped for unstated reasons.87 When Judge Rightor 
dismissed the other case, Ursin Dellande v. George H. Gordon, on the grounds that Gordon, then a 
school principal, was a functionary who was merely acting on the orders of the school board, 
Belden sued the school board in Dellande's name.88 In his briefs at the local and state supreme 
court levels, Belden referred to the same provisions of the 1868 Louisiana constitution as he had in 
Trevigne, but this time invoked the Fourteenth Amendment generally, rather than singling out the 
Privileges or Immunities Clause. The Fourteenth Amendment made all people "equal before the 
law," which, Belden claimed, meant the same thing as did article 135, the explicit school 
integration provision of the 1868 state constitution. Citing two Louisiana and one U.S. Supreme 
court public accommodations cases that had ruled separate but equal unlawful, Belden again 
grounded his case on the confluence of state and federal constitutional provisions.89 
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In his May 20, 1878 district opinion, Judge Rightor wrote as if an 1877 Democratic law had 
not merely repealed the Radical 1869 school integration statute, but had blotted Lhe earlier act out 
of memory-as, indeed, it was no doubt meant to. Article 135 was not self-executing, but "a mere 
general declaration addressed to the legislative department," unenforceable by the judiciary. Even 
the Radicals in the legislature, the impartial jurist announced, had failed to implement an 
integrationist policy "which upsets the whole order of society, tramples upon the usages of 
centuries and contains the germ of social war . . . so much do men shrink in action from what their 
madness may proclaim in theory."9 0 Rather than respond directly to this revisionism in his appellate 
brief, perhaps because it would have forced him to admit that the 1869 law had been overturned, 
Belden rested his case on natural rights constitutional theory: "No enabling act is ever necessary to 
carry into effect a constitutional declaration of a personal right or liberty. It [the declaration] is 
simply the enunciation of a pre-existing right and carries the force of recognition in the declaration 
made."91 
The Louisiana supreme court delayed justice in order to deny it. Although Rightor made 
his decision in May, 1878, the supreme court waited three years to issue its judgment, which it 
reported in a mere one sentence summary.92 In the meantime, the 1879 Redeemer state 
constitutional convention expunged articles 2, 13, and 135 from the constitution, leaving the rights 
of blacks to the mercies of Democratic legislators and administrators.9 3 Justice Felix Poche might 
have stopped after recognizing that the articles' repeal mooted the state-based part of the case. (He 
ignored the Fourteenth Amendment entirely.) But the Justice, a plantation-born Louisianian whose 
college oration was a panegyric of John C. Calhoun, and a Democratic activist who had been key 
member of the education committee at the 1879 constitutional convention, went on to deny that the 
now-moribund article 135 had been meant to prohibit segregation! 9 4  The Radicals, according to 
Poche, had not even clearly intended to establish separate but equal, but only to ban "public schools 
for the exclusive benefit of any race" which would "entirely deprive other races of school facilities 
or privileges . . . .  "95 No wonder the Court did not print its opinion. 
In an earlier editorial, the New Orleans Daily Picayune condemned the Republicans who 
had recently been unseated from the state supreme court. "Many of these [Republicans'] decisions 
bear evidences of a strong political bias, and of the influence of the partisan and sectional 
prejudices and passions of the times. The present [Democratic] tribunal is composed of men who 
have too exalted an idea of the responsibility and dignity of their position to yield to any such 
influence, or to be swerved from the straight path of jurisprudential truth, logic and authority by any 
political considerations or sentiments. It is a great blessing to our people to have this confidence in 
the purity of this tribunal of last resort to receive from so pure a source, the true doctrines and 
interpretations of their legal rights and duties. "96 
Shortly after Dellande had first been filed, New Orleans blacks prosecuted a fourth 
anti-segregation case, this time in the federal district court of William B. Woods.9 7 Through his 
skillful lawyer John Ray,98 Arnold Bertonneau charged that by excluding his sons John and Henry 
from the school nearest his residence, the board of education had denied them nationally guaranteed 
privileges or immunities, as well as the equal protection of the laws.99 Like Belden, Ray based his 
case not only on the Fourteenth Amendment, but on article 135 of the 1868 state constitution.100 
Article 135 gave Bertonneau the right as a state citizen to a nonsegregated education. To deny that 
right was an abrogation of his Fourteenth Amendment right to the equal protection of state laws, 
even if integration were not guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment per se (which Ray did not 
admit). For the "degradation placed on" Bertonneau and his family by the act of segregation, Ray 
asked $10,000 damages and an order requiring school officials to admit Bertonneau's sons to their 
neighborhood school. 100 
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Jonas and Farrar, who again represented the school board, simply ignored Ray's elaborate 
statements on the federal laws and the state and national constitutions and denied that the court ever 
had jurisdiction over any controversy between a state and a citizen of the same state.102 Under this 
constitutional theory, the state could prohibit black education entirely, reinstitute the post-Civil 
War black codes that had so inflamed northern public opinion, or even reestablish slavery. True, 
article 3 of the 1868 state constitution prohibited slavery, and other provisions guaranteed 
education for all children and sought to prohibit legal discrimination by race. But if the state courts 
refused to vindicate a black's equally clear right to be admitted into a common school under section 
135, and federal courts were powerless to intervene, what legal remedy would a slave have unless, 
like Dred Scott, he happened to be owned by a resident of another state?103 Perhaps like Judge 
Rightor and Justice DeBlanc, Jonas and Farrar wished to revise history - in their case, to deny that 
the Civil War took place. 
Judge Woods did not go quite that far.104 A "doughface" Democrat (a "northern man with 
southern priniciples") in Ohio before the War, Woods as speaker of the Ohio House had continued 
to lambaste the Lincoln administration and oppose all efforts to prepare for war until the day Fort 
Sumter was fired upon. He then became a patriot and a soldier, being brevetted to the rank of major 
general before his decommissioning. Though a nominal Republican when he settled in Alabama 
after the War, he was always sufficiently conciliatory to white southerners to avoid being treated as 
a stereotypical carpetbagger, and when he was nominated for the U.S. Supreme Court in 1880, there 
was an outpouring of support from southern bar association meetings. His three-page opinion in 
Bertonneau, the first printed opinion by a federal district judge on the constitutionality of 
segregated schools, was undoubtedly a major reason for the support that white southerners gave 
him.1os 
Without giving any consideration whatsoever to the argument that excluding a person from 
a public school because of race degraded him and denied him the "equal benefit" of the laws, 
guaranteed in the national 1866 civil rights act, Woods merely asserted that under segregation 
"Both races are treated precisely alike. White children and colored children are compelled to attend 
different schools. That is all. The state, while conceding equal privileges and advantages to both 
races, has the right to manage its schools in the manner which, in its judgment, will best promote 
the interest of all."106 Ignoring cases from Michigan and Iowa that had ruled segregation unlawful, 
Woods lifted one phrase from a prosegregation case from his native Ohio and another from U.S. 
Supreme Court Justice Nathan Clifford's one-man attempt to revivify the doughface tradition in 
Hall v. De Cuir.1w "Any classification which preserves substantially equal school advantages," 
Judge Woods disingenuously asserted, "does not impair any rights and is not prohibited by 
constitution of the United States. Equality of rights does not necessarily imply identity ofrights."108 
Moreover, if segregation did no damage to any federal right, that was the end of the inquiry. Even 
if article 135 gave blacks rights to non-exclusion as Louisianians, the federal court lacked 
"authority to inquire into every violation of a state law or state constitution by officers of the 
state."109 This striking extension of Justice Samuel Miller's view in Slaughter-House that the 
Privileges or Immunities Clause protected only the rights Americans held as national citizens 
lacked even Miller's crucial linguistic evidence in its favor, for the Equal Protection Clause applied 
to all "persons," not just to "citizens of the United States.""0 
In its triumphant editorial commending Woods' rebuff to what it called "political and social 
theorizers," the New Orleans Daily Picayune lamented a little that Woods had not gone further and 
ruled that the Fourteenth Amendment could not "be invoked to set aside any regulations of the 
subject of education that the State may choose to make."m Even so, Woods' blank check gave 
Democrats the ability to slash expenditures for the education of blacks and poor whites with no fear 
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of effective judicial intervention. In 1900, Louisiana had the highest rate of black illiteracy among 
adult males in t.'1e south, as well as the second highest rate for whites.112 
Bertonneau filed a bond for an appeal to the U.S. Supreme Court- he was the second 
black plaintiff in a school segregation case to do so - but the appeal was abandoned for unstated 
reasons.113 
B. Kansas-Of Floors & Ceilings 
In Louisiana, the contrasts between pro- and anti-integration forces were clear and stark, 
the stakes, high, and the constitutional issues, broadly drawn. In Kansas, on the other hand, 
divisions were blurred, struggles, often inconclusive, and legal questions, narrow. At the mouth of 
the Mississippi, statutory guarantees proved worthless when administered by unfriendly hands. 
Along the same river system, but further north, blacks could usually invoke the state civil rights law 
successfully, but could not extend it to the larger cities, and they often had to go to court to obtain 
their rights. In consequence, there were at least fourteen court cases on school integration in 
Kansas from 1880 to 1910 (see Table 2), and, while the blacks won at least eight of them, the legal 
doctrines enunciated did not expand on Tinnon. 
[Table 2 about here ] 
During the 1870s, the black percentage of the population in Topeka rose to 31 %, which 
exceeded that of Orleans parish, Louisiana (27% ).114 Most of the black immigrants probably came 
from the south (one section of Topeka became known as "Tennesseetown") during the black 
"exodus" late in the decade. Almost immediately after arriving from the south, where schools, if 
available at all to blacks, were usually very poor, and, outside Louisiana, always strictly segregated, 
Topeka blacks began political and legal actions to bring about integration. There may have been a 
test case as early as 1878, and the 1880 Phillips suit illustrates both the porous quality of 
segregation in Kansas and the sort of incident that typically set off northern school integration 
cases.115 
At the opening of school in October, 1880, Eveline and Lilly Phillips were refused 
admission to the mostly white Clay St. school, which they had attended during the preceding year, 
and sent instead to an all-black school much farther from their house - a school named, ironically, 
for the deceased national leader of the school integration struggle, Charles Sumner. After 
personally appealing to the teacher, the superintendent of schools, and various board members, their 
father, James Phillips, sued, charging a violation of the state civil rights law. Conceding that 
Topeka had recently attained the population requisite to qualify as a first-class city, which would 
allow it, under the 1879 statute, to maintain segregated schools, Phillips's counsel pointed out that 
the mayor had not yet completed the requirements to bring the city under the shelter of the first 
class city law.116 While the litigation was continued, apparently because both sides expected the 
1881 legislature to repeal the 1879 law allowing segregation in first-class cities, some blacks seem 
to have boycotted Sumner school.117 The suit was later dismissed on what one historian calls a 
"technicality" .118
Had it reached the state supreme court, Phillips might have set a useful precedent for 
integrationists, because the judges would presumably have had to face the question of whether the 
Fourteenth Amendment prohibited segregation, and Valentine's opinion in Tinnon seemed to 
promise a majority for an affirmative answer. At least one contemporary legal observer even 
believed that the U.S. Supreme Court would decide the question that way, and, indeed, there is little 
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in the language and specific findings in Slaugh ter-House, Strauder v. West Virginia, and the Civil 
Rights Cases to indicate otherwise.119
However powerfully and clearly stated an appellate court opinion, there is, in the American 
system, little besides fear of embarrassment to force lower court or future appellate court judges to 
follow precedents. South Topeka, a second class city in the mid-1880s, had no attendance zones, 
but assigned all black students to one school, and all whites, to another. Each school served the 
same grades, allegedly had the same seating capacity and equally competent teachers, and was 
approximately equally convenient to the homes of plaintiffs Columbus Daniel and Violet Jordan. 
But when on September 20, 1 886, Daniel and Jordan attempted to register at the white Walnut 
Grove school, they were told that the room in which grades 3-6 were taught was full, 57 white 
students haviug enrolled, and that they should go to the black Quincy Street school, which had only 
25 students in the room for grades 3-6.120 
Despite an extensive argument by future Congressman, Senator, and Vice President Charles 
Curtis121 applying the clearly governing Tinnon precedent to the case, district court judge John 
Guthrie, 122 recognizing that the law was against him, decided the case on "the facts." The white 
teacher just couldn't effectively minister to more than 57 students in four grades - how the judge 
knew that 57 and not 59 was the tipping point, he did not say. To force the school board to transfer 
some whites to Quincy Street in order to allow Daniel to attend Walnut Grove, moreover, would 
mean that "The colored boy would have advantages that would be denied to the white boy." How 
racial assignment in a second class city could be legal under Tinnon or the 1874 Kansas civil rights 
bill, Guthrie did not bother to explain.123 
Twenty-five miles northeast and some years later, blacks in the hamlet of Oskaloosa tried 
to enter the high school, which, under Kansas law, they had a perfect right to attend. Yet the 
Kansas supreme court, in a one paragraph per curiam decision, brushed aside their contention, 
ruling that the racially separate schools were equal even though whites, but not blacks, could 
continue past the ninth grade.124
Yet in two other small towns towns in eastern Kansas, Toganoxie and Olathe, 
Republican125 and Democratic126 district court judges, relying only on Tinnon, ordered the schools 
integrated in cases in which the facts were very similar to those in Daniel.127 And in a case from 
Independence, Kansas supreme court justice Albert H. Horton curtly ruled that blacks could not be 
excluded from the only school in the ward in which they lived. Tinnon, he held, was 
determinative.128 The only novelty in the Independence case was that it was the first school 
integration case at the state supreme court level in which all the plaintiffs' attorneys were black. 
One of the lawyers, William A. Price, had been born a slave, while the other, younger man, Albert 
M. Thomas, had been one of the first black graduates of the University of Michigan Law School. 129
The state supreme court ruled similarly in a 1906 case from Coffeyville130 and a 1907 case from 
Wichita, 131 and in a 1908 Parsons case, it went further in examiuing the facts, declaring that 
integration was a fitting remedy for extreme inequalities even in first-class cities.132
Having avoided the issue of whether school segregation was contrary to the Kansas 
constitution and the Fourteenth Amendment in Tinnon in 1881 ,  Crawford in 1 889,133 and Jones in
1900, the Kansas supreme court finally faced it in 1903.134 Lowman Hill, then on Topeka's
outskirts, had had racially mixed elementary schools, and continued to do so after beiug annexed to 
the city. In 1900, however, the school accidentally burned down, but before a new brick school 
opened in 1902 at a less swampy location than the old one, white patrons petitioned the school 
board to segregate schools in the area. The board secretly agreed and left nearly half the rooms in 
the brick building unfinished, while dragging to the old site an abandoned frame school building 
from central Topeka.135 Unaccustomed segregation and resentment at the contrast between the 
up-to-date white building on the hill and the second-hand one for blacks down in the hollow 
touched off a black protest, a boycott (100% successful for four months), and, when the 
Republican-dominated board refused any compromise, a suit.136 
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The participants in the suit were pa1ticularly notable. Tennessee-born William Reynolds 
was a young tailor and political activist who had been a captain in the Spanish-American war 
during the 1 890s.137 His chief lawyer was one of the town characters, Gaspar Christopher Clemens, 
born poor in Xenia, Ohio, orphaned and left to fend for himself at 13,  open agnostic, public 
defender of the Haymarket anarchists, leading advisor to Populist governor L. D. Lewelling, and 
later Socialist gubernatorial candidate himself, a prolific newspaper controversialist, pamphleteer, 
and legal treatise writer.138 The lead opposing counsel was James Wilson Gleed, Vermont-born 
grandson of a pioneer abolitionist minister, scion of a family wealthy enough to provide him with a 
European tour, railroad lawyer, 1 0-year school board veteran, president of the state temperance 
alliance, and legal defender (against Clemens) of compulsory prayer and Bible-reading in the 
schools.139 Clemens, who claimed to be a cousin of Mark Twain, loved to taunt people whom he 
considered pharisaical hypocrites, and he no doubt relished the chance to spar with Gleed.140 
Oemens charged that segregation violated the Thirteenth as well as the Fourteenth 
Amendment because it placed on blacks "the badge of a servile race, and holds them up to public 
gaze as unfit to associate, even in a public institution of the State, with other races and nationalities . 
. . " 141 He also cited the 1 859 state constitution's "equal protection and benefit" and "uniform 
system of common schools" clauses, 142 as well as making technical arguments about what laws, in 
the confusing welter of Kansas statues, were legally in force.143 
The Kansas electorate in 1900 expanded the state supreme court from three to seven 
members, and gave Republican governor William E. Stanley the right to nominate the four new 
ones.144 Valentine, Horton, and Brewer were now gone, and into their places and the new seats 
moved men almost all of whom were too young to have participated in the abolition movement, the 
Civil War, or even Reconstruction. The average justice in Reynolds was born in 1 853, the year 
before the passage of the Kansas-Nebraska Act, and at the time of the passage of the Kansas Civil 
Rights Act in 1 874, he had barely reached manhood.145 For many in the earlier generation, the 
Republican party was "the party of great moral ideals" forged in the struggle against slavery, 
secession, and racism. For most in the Reynolds era, it was the convenient choice of aspiring 
railroad lawyers, the haven of the satisfied bourgeois, the party, to use a phrase common in the state 
of the time, of "stand-pat." 
Justice Rosseau Burch did not distinguish between the state and national equal protection 
clauses or a similar guarantee in the 1780 Massachusetts constitution, and he seemed to view the 
"uniformity" and "common schools" clauses as more specific applications of the concept of equality 
to schools.146 The uniformity and common schools phrases of the 1 85 1  Indiana constitution, on 
which the 1 859 Kansas constitution makers no doubt drew, had been construed by the supreme 
court in Burch's home state as allowing segregation.147 Uniformity, Burch held, did not prevent 
school boards from establishing different types of schools in city and rural areas or in different 
sub-districts, and they could make any classification of scholars that they judged best.148 Whereas 
Justice Valentine in Tinnon had scornfully dismissed the defendant's reliance on the 1 850 
Massachusetts case of Roberts v. Boston as a "very old" decision that was "rendered before the 
war," Burch padded his pages with quotations from its segregationist dogma.149 State supreme court 
decisions from Ohio, New York, and California ruling school segregation in accord with the 
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Fourteenth Amendment largely disposed of that question, 150 Burch averred, and if this were not 
enough, he invented a novel reading of the argument from silence: The fact that no school 
segregation case had ever reached the U.S. Supreme Court proved "a remarkable consensus of 
opinion on the part of the bar of the country as to the result of such an appeal."151 Moreover, U.S. 
Supreme Court Justice Brown's decision in Plessy, in an aside, had cited the same state cases as 
Burch had upholding the validity of school segregation.152 The patent inequality of the school 
facilities Burch dismissed as a mere "incidental matter," and the Thirteenth Amendment argument, 
he entirely ignored.153 There was, as usual in the Kansas supreme court, no dissent.154 
V. IMPLICATIONS FOR CONTEMPORY TACTICS IN THE PROTECTION 
O F  CONSTITUTIONAL RI GHTS . 
It was a long way, figuratively speaking, from Ottawa to Topeka, and an even longer and 
bloodier one from John Howard's optimistic, egalitarian argument in Isabelle to Judge Felix 
PocM's desecretion of the moribund 1868 Louisiana constitution's integration clause, but both 
journeys reaffirm the old aphorism that constitutions are what the judges say they are. The 
protections offered by laws and the state and federal constitutions were not useless. Blacks did win 
nearly half the cases sketched in this paper, and in other instances, they no doubt used the laws and 
decisions as levers to wedge the school door open or at least to obtain physical and other 
improvements in racially isolated schools. In Kansas, the state supreme court might well have 
ruled all school segregation unconstitutional, and legislators did outlaw it from 1874 to 1879 and 
only barely failed in another repeal attempt in 1889. After 1874, Kansas blacks outside the larger 
cities never lost the nominal right to attend racially mixed schools. The political careers of judges, 
legislators and lawyers who fought for equal rights did not suffer, as might be expected if white 
racism had been omnipresent. But in the end in both states, blacks lost out because a new set of 
racist judges took office and emasculated constitutional guarantees. 
To assess the adequacy of judicial protection of rights at the state level, it is obviously 
necessary to go beyond printed cases. Only half of the twenty cases treated here appear in 
casebooks, and the briefs, which especially in Louisiana contain much more theoretically 
interesting arguments than the judges' opinions, must be ferretted out in archives. Furthermore, the 
judge-centered constitutional history that still dominates the field should be broadened to include 
pressure groups, legislators, and those who bring and argue cases. While judges are by no means 
the passive seers of convenient myth, they and the Framers are not the only relevant shapers of the 
constitution, either. It is those non-judicial figures who struggled for constitutional rights - and 
mostly lost - who impress me most in the dramas from these two states, and it is is they, not those 
who passed upon and denied their pleas, whose memory deserves to last: Belden, Bertonneau, 
Isabelle, Ray, and Trevigne of Louisiana; Clemens, Curtis, Daniel, Reynolds, and Tinnon of 
Kansas. 
In the briefs and opinions in these cases, state and national laws and constitutional 
provisions were intermixed not simply because nineteenth century jurisprudents were confused or 
imprecise, but because the motives of those who passed the enactments and the basic issues 
involved really were the same, regardless of distinctions of form. Proponents of equality might 
appeal to state law, as in Knox; to natural law, as in Isabelle and Tinnon; to the state constitution, as 
in Trevigne; to a combination of the state and national constitutions, as in Bertonneau; or to all of 
these, as in Reynolds. But, to paraphrase Judge Woods, there was no "substantial" distinction 
between the contentions, whatever their formal bases. 
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More recent claims of "separate state grounds" are not only often patently disingenuous, 
they are potentially destructive of constitutional rights. In his most recent pronouncement on the 
subject - ironically in lectures named for James Madison, who more than anyone else understood 
how size and diversity protect civil rights - Justice William J. Brennan, Jr. repeatedly promised 
his audience that "federal preservation of civil liberties is a minimum, which the states may 
surpass ... "155 Nineteenth century school segregation cases suggest that this view is both too 
optimistic and too simple. It is too optimistic because state judicial interpretations of laws, 
constitutions, and written understandings do not stand apart, but help to shape the ultimate readings 
of national rights by the Supreme Court. State and lower federal court judges, and state legislators 
as well, can raise the ceiling or undermine the floor of those rights. It is too simple because, as 
John Ray and Simeon Belden understood, all the guarantees - of natural law, national and state 
laws, and national and state constitutions - form part of the same structure. To rest the foundation 
of rights on state laws or constitutions alone is to hazard a collapse of the whole building later. It is 
better, the experiences of nineteenth century Louisiana and Kansas show us, for judges to declare 
openly and honestly that their opinions rest on their fundamental views of liberty, equality, and 
reasonableness drawn from their study of not only the constitutions of their state governments, but 
also that of the national government and of moral philosophy and their own practical experience in 
policymaking. That was what Justice Daniel Valentine actually did in Tinnon, and if he had just 















TA BLE 1: 
Kansas L egislative and C onstitutional Convention 
A ctions on Black S chool R ights 
Nature of Bill Action on Bill 
or Amendment (Journal Reference)* 
Exclude blacks Passed 
End exclusion Passed 
Equal expend. Lost, 26-6 
ban integration Lost, 25-17 
exclude blacks Lost, 26-25 
Sep.but equal Passed 
seg.tax, schools 
in Marysville Passed 
Seg. taxes.schools 
in !st class cities Passed 
Equal tax, possibly Passed 
seg. schools 
Sep. but equal in Passed 
2nd class cities 
Sep.but equal 
(reenacted 1861 law) Passed 
fines if blacks not 
offered education Passed 
Sep. but equal in (H.B. 131) 
!st class cities House 66-0 (HJ, 535-6) 
(no seg. taxes) Sen. 23-0 (SJ, 399) 
Require seg. schools (H.B. 219) 
no vote (HJ,661) 
Sep.but equal in (H.B. 478) 
2nd class cities House 56-0 (HJ,910) 
Sen. I 7-0(SJ,588) 
No seg. in (H.B 39) 
Session Law 
Reference 
Ch.144,art. l,sec. l 
Ch.8,sec.71 
Debates,170-75 
Ch. 76, art. 3, sec.1 
Private, Ch. 43,sec.5 
Ch.46, art. 4, sec.18 
Ch.46, sec. l 
Ch. 69, sec. 7 
Ch. 123 ,sec. 1 





Kansas S chool Integration Cases, 1880 - 1910 
Plaintiff Defendant School Date Level1 Outcome2 Reported 
Board 
Eveline Phillips Topeka 1880 L ? N 
Leslie Tinnon Ottawa 1881 L B N 
s B y 
Columbus Daniel South Topeka 1886 L w y 
? Tonganoxie 1889 L B N 
Georgianna Reeves Ft. Scott 1888 L w N 
Buford Crawford Ft. Scott 1889 s w N 
Luella Johnson Olathe 1890 L B N 
Jordan Knox Independence 1891 s B y 
George Jones Oskaloosa 1901 s w y 
William Reynolds Topeka 1903 s w y 
Bud Cartwright Coffeville 1906 s B y 
Mamie Richardson Kansas City 1906 s w y 
Sallie Rowles Wichita 1907 s B y 
D.A. Williams Parsons 1908 s B y 
1 L = local court S = state supreme court 
2 ?  = unknown B = black victory W = school board victory 
Session Nature of Bill Action on Bill Session Law 
or Amendment (Journal Reference)* Reference 
2nd class cities House, 67-2 (HJ, 642) 
Sen. 22-1 (SJ, 436-7) Ch.65, sec.5 
no racial disc. (H.B. 247) 
in schools House, 57-7 (HJ, 980-1) 
1 874 No exclusion from any (H.B.1) Ch.49 ,sec. 1 
school House 64-17 (HJ,662-3) 
Sen, 24-2 (SJ, 313) 
1876 No exclusion from any (S.B. 202) Ch. 122, art. 5, sec.3 
school House, 56--30 (HJ, 1386--9) 
Sen, 27-4 (SJ, 698-701) 
reenacted 1867, Ch. 125, sec. 1 
no authority for seg. Part of Ch. 122, art.5, sec. 4 
in 1st class cities S.B. 202 
banned seg. in 2nd 
class cities Ch. 122,art. 1 1  
1879 Sep.but equal in (S.B. 35) 
1st class cities Senate,30-0 (SJ, 430) Ch.8 1 ,sec.1 
House, 96-4 (HJ, 1069-70) 
1881  Repeal 1879 law, (S.B.238) 
Ch. 8 1 ,sec. 1 Sen, 25-3 (SJ, 533) 
1889 Allow seg. in 1st class (S.B. 197) 
cities only if 2/3 no floor action 
of each race favor, 
neighborhood schools 
ban seg. in Wichita (S.B. 351) Ch.227,sec.4 
House, 78-0 (HJ, 897-8) 
ban seg. in 1st class (S.B. 108) 
cities Senate, 29-0 (SJ, 474) 
ban seg. everywhere (H.B. 42) 
(part of gen.school Sen., 10-24 (SJ, 922,970) 
school law revision) House, 93-0 (HJ, 442-3) 
Session Nature of Bill 
or Amendment 
1905 seg. h.s. ok in KC 
1 9 1 1  seg. h.s. ok in 
lst class cities 
*HJ = House Journal, relevant year 
SJ = Senate Journal, relevant year 
Action on Bill 
(Journal Reference)* 
Passed 
House, 1 19--0 






1 .  State of Louisiana e x  rel. R.H. Isabelle v. Board o f  Public School Directors o f  Orleans 
Parish, was not reported in any official document. The sketchy case records, hereafter 
referred to as Isabelle Case File (Case #153, 8th District Court, Orleans Parish, 1 870) are in 
the Orleans Parish Public Library. The opinion of the court, some background information, 
and editorial responses are in New Orleans Daily Pic ayune, Nov.22, 1870, 2, 4; Nov.24, 
1870, 1 ,  4; New Orleans Times, May 1, 1 870, 4; August 20, 1870, 4; Nov. 22, 1 870, 5 ;  
Nov. 23, 1 870, 4 ;  New Orleans Republican, Nov. 22, 1870, 5. I discovered this case while 
perusing the San Francisco Elevator, Mar. 14, 1874, 2. 
2. The relevant sentences of article 135 stated: "All children of this state between the ages of 
six and twenty-one shall be admitted to the public schools or other institutions of learning 
sustained or established by the State in common, without distinction of race, color, or 
previous condition. There shall be no separate schools or institutions of learning 
established exclusively for any race by the State of Louisiana." Francis Newton Thorpe, 
The Federal And State Constitutions (Washington, D.C.: G.P.O., 1909), III, 1465.
3. Act 1 2 1 ,  section 8 1 ,  Louisiana Laws (1 869). On Isabelle's role in the 1869 and 1 870 
legislative sessions, see Charles Vincent, Black Legislators In Louisiana During
Reconstruction (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State Univ. Press, 1976), 89-97. 
4. The background of this struggle may be followed in Roger Fischer, The Segregation
Struggle In Louisiana (Urbana, Ill.: Univ. of Illinois Press, 1974), 1 1 3-14. See also the 
classic article by Louis R. Harlan, "Desegregation in New Orleans Public Schools During 
Reconstruction," American Historical Review, 67 (1962), 663-75. 
5. Act 6, Louisiana Laws (1 870) 12-29. In the usual calm, measured phrases of Louisiana 
Democrats of the era, the New Orleans Times, November 23, 1 870, 4 denounced Conway 
as "that malignant, ignorant and vulgar demagogue and insatiate enemy of this people . . .  " 
whose only purpose was " . . .  with diabolical activity, to kindle bitter hostilities between 
the white and colored people." The legislature it denounced as " . . .  that body of 
unparalleled ignorance, dishonesty and corruption." Blacks, the paper felt sure, preferred 
segregation, but Conway and "a few pestulent [sic] white demagogues" forced integration 
on them. 
6. The House voted 44-1 1 to require integrated schools in New Orleans. This explicit 
amendment was later shelved, and the matter disposed of in a general education bill, but the 
action clearly indicates the legislature 's intent. See New Orleans Daily Republican, Feb. 
12, 1 869, 3. 
7. During the debate over the integrated schools provision of the U.S. Civil Rights Bill in 
1874, Conway claimed in a public letter that school integration had worked in New Orleans 
and asserted, in a touchingly idealistic statement that echoes many similar remarks of the 
1950s, "All that is wanted in this matter of civil rights is to let the foes of the measure 
simply understand that we mean it." Washington (D.C.) New National Era, June 4, 1874, 
2. 
8.  Isabelle Case File. 
18 
9.  A convenient introduction to the vast historiography of the Fourteenth Amendment is  Eric 
Foner, Reconstruction: America's Unfinished Revolution, 1863-1877 (New York: Harper 
& Row, 1988), 25 1-261 .  
10. Born in Indiana in 1 844 of an old but not particularly prosperous New England family, 
Dibble enlisted in the Civil War in 1862 and lost a leg in the battle of Port Hudson. During 
his recuperation in Louisiana, he read law, and was admitted to the barbefore he was 21.
By the age of 23, he was the de facto head of the Republican organization in New Orleans. 
President of the school board for all six integrationist years, he was twice nominated for 
Congress, but defeated by the Democrats. He was acting state attorney general in 1875. In 
1 8 8 1 ,  he moved to Arizona, where he became the law partner of former Nevada Supreme 
Court Judge James F. Lewis, who had sat in the school integration case of Nelson
Stoutmeyer v. James Duffy et al., 7 Nev. 342 (1 872). In 1883, Dibble moved to San
Francisco, where he was still residing in 1905. Very successful there, he served for several 
terms in the California legislature as a Republican. An excellent orator, he also published 
at least one romantic western novel. See Leigh H. Irvine, A History of the New California,
2 vols. (New York: Lewis, 1905), II, 7 1 8-20; Dale Somers, "Black and White in New 
Orleans: A Study in Urban Race Relations, 1865-1900," Journal of Southern History 40 
(1974), 27; New Orleans Republican, Dec. 19, 1 874, 2.
1 1 . Born in Ohio in 1830 of New York forebearers, Valentine moved to Kansas in 1859 and 
lived in Ottawa from 1860 to 1875. Son of a restless farmer, Valentine had only a common 
school education. A staunch Republican, he served in the state House, 1862; the Senate, 
1863; on the district court bench, 1 865-69; and the supreme court, 1869-93. Henry Inman, 
"The Supreme Court of Kansas," The Green Bag 4 (1 892) 338; Howard D. Berrett, Who' s 
Who in Topeka (Topeka: Adams Bros., 1905), 124; 3 Kan. L.J. 353 (1886). The other 
member of the majority in Tinnon, Chief Justice Albert H. Horton, was born in Brookfield, 
New York in 1837, and came to Atchison, Kansas, in 1859. Like Valentine, he sat in both 
houses of the legislature and on the district bench before being appointed to the high court 
in 1877. Son of a physician, he attended the University of Michigan. Horton was much 
more deeply involved in partisan politics than Valentine was, editing a newspaper during 
the Civil War, serving as a presidential elector for Grant in 1868, becoming federal district 
attorney from 1869 to 1873, and almost being elected to the U.S. Senate in 1885. Inman, 
"Supreme Court of Kansas," 333-35; Topeka Daily Capital, Sept. 3, 1902, 1-2, Sept. 4, 
1902, 4. 
12. 26 Kans. 1 (188 1).
13. Herbert Hovenkamp, "Social Science and Segregation before Brown," Duke L.J. (1985)
641-42. Similarly, in his Government By Judiciary: The Transformation of the Fourteenth
Amendment (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard Univ. Press, 1977), 10, Berger states: "The key to
an understanding of the Fourteenth Amendment is that the North was shot through with 
Negrophobia, that the Republicans, except for a minority of extremists, were swayed by the 
racism that gripped their constituents rather than by abolitionist ideology."
19  
14. That Radical Republicans, white and black, northern and southern, shared a common
ideology is suggested by the parallel sentiments of Robert H. Isabelle in the Louisiana
legislature in 1 870: "I want to see the children of the state educated together. I want to see
them play together; to be amalgamated (laughter). I want to see them play together, to 
study together and when they grow up to be men they will love each other, and be ready, if
any force comes against the flag of the United States, to take up arms and defend it
together." Quoted in John W. Blassingame, Black New Orleans, 1860-1880 (Chicago:
Univ. of Chicago Press, 1973), 1 12.
15. 26 Kans. 1, 1 8-19, 21-23. 
16. Ibid., 1 8-19, 21-23.
17. Roberts v. City of B oston, 5 Cush. 198 (1849); Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537 (1896).
On these and other case on segregation in the nineteenth century see J. Morgan Kousser,
Dead End: The Development Of Nineteenth-Century Litigation On Racial Discrimination 
In Schools (Fair Lawn, N. J.: Oxford Univ. Press, 1986); Kousser, "'The Supremacy of
Equal Rights' :  The Struggle Against Racial Discrimination in Antebellum Massachusetts 
and the Foundations of the Fourteenth Amendment," Northwestern Univ. Law Review
(1988), forthcoming. 
1 8. 26 Kans. 1 ,  24 (188 1). 
19. Ibid. The judges of the supreme court, of course, were elected by voters throughout the 
state. On Brewer, see Arnold Paul, "David J. Brewer," Leon Friedman and Fred Israel,
eds., The Justices of The U.S. Supreme Court, 1 789-1969: Their Lives and Major
Opinions (New York: Chelsea House, 1969), II, 1516; John Semonche, Charting The 
Future - The Supreme Court Responds To A Changing Society, 1890-1920 (Westport, Ct.:
Greenwood Press, 1978), 15, 21 ;  Albert H. Horton, "Brewer, David Josiah," The Green Bag
2 (1890) l ;  Morton Keller, Affairs of State: Public Life in Late Nineteenth Century America 
(Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard Univ. Press, 1977), 366; Leavenworth Times, August 22,
1 865, 3;  August 29, 1866, 2. Paul tenns Brewer "An outspoken and doctrinaire 
conservative, who made little pretense of 'judicial self-restraint'. . .  " Tinnon was the only 
one of 130 cases in 26 Kans. in which there was a dissent. 
20. 16 Sup. Ct. 1 138-43. On this finesse, see Kousser, Dead End, 26-27, 54.
21 .  Interestingly, a Radical Republican school board had voted to integrate the Ottawa schools 
in 1 870, claiming that separate schools were too expensive and that black children made 
much quicker progress if integrated with white kids. "[T]here is little room now to doubt," 
a board committee wrote, "that by virtue of the [13th and 14th] constitutional amendments, 
the laws of Kansas, and the decisions of the courts, the black man has equal rights with the 
white man in schools which he is taxed alike to support . . . .  the cry of 'negro equality' is a 
bug-bear only calculated to frighten timorous aristocrats . . .  " Judge Stephens's judicial 
position was merely the party line of the Radicals. Washington D.C. New National Era, 
Oct. 20, 1870, l ;  March 2, 1 871,  3. 
20 
22. Slaughter House Cases, 16 Wall. 36 (1873); Strauder v. West Virginia, 100 U.S. 303
(1880); Washington, Alexandria, and Georgetown Railroad Co. v. Brown, 1 7  Howard 445 
(1873). Stephens's opinion is in Ottawa Daily Republican, Jan. 19,1881 ,  2. Rejecting the
disingenuous contention that the school board's action was racially neutral because whites
were barred from black schools, as well as the reverse, Stephens read the discriminatory
motive of the school board's action on the face of its policy. "It is evident as to the purpose 
of the rule," he announced, without extended consideration. 
23. William J. Brennan, Jr., "The Bill of Rights and the States: The Revival of State
Constitutions as Guardians of Individual Rights," in Norman Dorsen, ed., The Evolving
Constitution: Essays On the Bill of R ights And The U.S. Supreme Court (Middletown, Ct.:
Wesleyan Univ. Press, 1987), 254; Bradley D. McGraw, ed., Developments In State
Constitutional Law (St. Paul, Mn.: West Pub. Co., 1983).
24. Perhaps this feeling reflects only my lack of training as a lawyer. If I were properly
socialized, it might be that I would better appreciate, for instance, the profound differences
between state and federal equal rights clauses, instead of seeing such distinctions as 
fundamentally trivial. 
25. James Madison, et al., The Federalist, Jacob E. Cooke, ed. (Oeveland: World Pub!. Co.,
1961), 56-65.
26. The foremost pessimists about race relations on the left are Joel Williamson, The Crucible 
of Race (New York: Oxford Univ. Press, 1985); and Leon F. Litwack, North a/Slavery:
The Negro In The Free States, 1790-1860 (Chicago: Univ. of Chicago Press, 1961), and 
Been In The Storm So Long: The Emergence of Black Freedom In the South (New York: 
Alfred A. Knopf, 1979). Sharing their pessimism and drawing on Litwack's scholarship, 
but deducing much less liberal policy conclusions, is Berger, Government By Judiciary. 
The classic expression of this viewpoint is Ulrich B. Phillips, "The Central Theme of
Southern History'', Am. Hist. Rev. 34 (1928) 30-43.
27. J. Willard Hurst, Law and The Conditions of Freedom in the Nineteenth Century United
States (Madison, WI.: Univ. of Wisconsin Press, 1960); Morton Horwitz, The
Transformation of American Law, 1790-1860 (Cambridge, Mass: Harvard Univ. Press, 
1977). Although there are exceptions, scholarship in constitutional history continues to be 
predominantly "intemalist," to borrow a phrase from the history of science.
28. Thus, none of the numerous books and articles on Louisiana history during this period
mentions the unpublished Joubert or Dellande cases, or the Louisiana supreme court's
opinion in Trevigne, and no one has treated the Isabelle or Bertonneau cases in any depth. 
Published discussions of the Kansas case are fragmentary at best, and Thomas C. Cox,
Blacks in Topeka, Kansas, 1865-1915, A Social History (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton Univ. 
Press, 1982), 1 13 misses the date of the Reynolds case by 13 years! The lawyer who 
appeared for the state before the U.S. Supreme Court in Brown v. Board of Education 
seriously misunderstood the succession of laws on school segregation in the 1 860s and 
1 870s. See Paul E. Wilson, "Brown v. Board of Education Revisited," 12. U. of Kans. L.
Rev. 509-13.
21 
29. When as a member of the 1 868 Louisiana legislature, John Ray, a "scalawag" who later 
represented Arnold Bertonneau in his attempt to prevent the resegregation of the New 
Orleans schools, voted for a public accomodations statute, he was marked for death by the
New Orleans Daily Picayune-no empty threat in a state where, according to House Misc. 
Docs., 41st Cong., 2d Sess., No. 154, Pt. 1 ,  at 161-62, over 1000 Republicans, white as 
well as black, were assassinated during 1868 alone. "DOOM FOR THE TRAITOR," the 
widely circulated paper titled its editorial. Ray was "this degenerate white man . . .  a great 
social criminal" because he had voted against "God's eternal decree of separation of the 
white and black races." Picayne, September 20, 1 868, quoted in Frank J. Wetta, "The 
Louisiana Scalawags" (unpub. Ph.D. thesis: Louisiana State Univ.,  1977), 336-337. 
T. H. Harris, the state superintendent of education in Louisiana from 1908 to 1940, 
asserted in his Orwellian history that school integration never took place in New Orleans! 
See Harris, The Story of Public Education in Louisiana (New Orleans: The Author, 1924), 
30-31 .  Similarly, the Democratic New Orleans Times, Oct. 3, 1877, 4, misremembered 
recent events: "In the darkest hours of the Radical regime there never were mixed schools 
except in theory." Evidently an 1874 riot against such schools had been a chimera. On the 
riot, see New Orleans Weekly Louisianian, Feb. 13, 1875, 1 .  
Two men who were involved on the other side of segregation cases, Robert H. Marr 
and Benjamin F. Jonas, who were among the leaders of the violent White League 
revolution against the legally constituted government of the state in 1 874, were rewarded 
with places on the state supreme court and in the U.S. Senate, respectively, and receive 
celebratory treatment in older state histories. See, e.g., Biographical and Historical 
Memoirs of Louisiana (Chicago: Goodspeed Pub. Co., 1 892), 201-202, hereafter referred to 
as B iographical Memoirs. 
30. Fischer, Segregation Struggle, 13-14. Interestingly, the state legislature in 1 854 allocated 
$2000 to the school in which Trevigne taught. H. E. Sterkx, The Free Negro In Antebellum
Louisiana (Rutherford, N.J.: Fairleigh Dickinson Univ. Press, 1972), 269.
3 1 .  Peyton McCrary, Abraham Lincoln and Reconstruction: The Louisiana Experiment
(Princeton, N.J.: Princeton Univ. Press, 1978), 264-65; Fischer, Segregation Struggle,
28-30.
32. Donald Everett, "Free Persons of Color in New Orleans, 1803-1865," (unpubl. Ph.D.
thesis, Tulane Univ., 1952), 348-49; William F. Messner, "Black Education in Louisiana,
1863-1865," 22 Civil War History (1976), 54-55; Debates in the Convention (New 
Orleans: W.R. Fish, 1864), 476, 499-502, 547-48.
33. Fischer, Segregation Struggle, 25-26; Debates, 1864, 575, 601. Messner, "Black
Education," 54-55. Article 141 of the 1864 constitution stated simply: "The legislature 
shall provide for the education of all children of the State, between the ages of six and 
eighteen years, by maintenance of free public schools by taxation or otherwise." Thorpe, 
Federal and State Constitutions III, 1446.
34. Fischer, Segregation Struggle, 27. 
22 
35. Ibid., 43. Paul Trevigne and Arnold Bertonneau were among the editors of the Tribune
and its precedessor, L' Union. In this case, as well as in many places in the north that had
relatively sparse black populations, the struggle for an end to exclusion and an end to
segregation largely coincided. The different pattern that Howard N. Rabinowitz, Race
Relations In The Urban South, 1865-1890 (New York: Oxford Univ. Press, 1978), 331-2
and passim, found in five other southern cities was by no means universal.
36. On the struggle for the provision, see Fischer, Segregation Struggle, 43-52. Article 135,
quoted above, n. 2, was adopted by 61-12. The vote, in which Belden joined with 
Bertonneau and Isabelle, is given in Journal of The Convention (1868), 201. The same
three men joined 55 others in adopting article 13, which banned segregation in public 
accomodations. There were only 16 dissenters on this article. Ibid., 121-25. A Unionist 
during the war, Belden was Speaker of the state house of representatives in 1 864. A native 
of New Orleans, he taught in the black Straight University law school (from which Robert 
Isabelle graduated) during Reconstruction. Ted Tunnell, Crucible of Reconstruction: War, 
Radicalism, & Race in Louisiana, 1862-1877 (Baton Rouge, La.: Louisiana State Univ.
Press, 1984), 21 ,  27, 98, 1 15 has Belden being born in both Massachusetts and "The
South," and for unstated reasons calls him a "conservative," but the 1 880 census and
Belden's obituary notice in the New Orleans Daily Picayune, Dec. 4, 1906 put his birth in
Louisiana. Other facts are from Blassingame, Black New Orleans, 127.
37. Act 121, Louisiana Laws (1869). Fischer, Segregation Struggle, 91-109, contains the best 
discussion of segregation outside New Orleans, finding evidence of scattered integration. 
See also Washington (D.C.) New National Era, June 1 1 ,  1 874, 3. Earlier histories, in 
Ministry of Truth fashion, denied that whites in the rural parishes had ever attended 
integrated schools. See Edwin Whitfield Fay, The History of Education in Louisiana
(Washington, D.C.: G.P.O., 1898), 101 .
38. Act #23, Louisiana Laws (1877), 28-39; Act #70, Louisiana Laws (1882), 90-93; Act #81 ,
Louisiana Laws (1888), 91-109.
39. On the reasons for their actions, see Harris, Story of Public Education, 52; Fischer, 
Segregation Struggle, 144-45.
40. Act #23, Louisiana Laws (1877), 28-39; Harris, Story of Public Education, 52.
4 1 .  New Orleans Times, July 4 ,  1877, 1 ,  8 ;  New Orleans Picayune, July 4 ,  1877, 8 .  New 
Orleans Democrat, Sept. 27, 1877, 8. About 300 people of (light) color reportedly entered 
"white" schools in New Orleans that fall, forcing officials to examine many pedigrees. By 
December, all but two of the schools had been segregated. In those two, authorities knew 
that some students were "colored," while others were "white," but were unable on the basis 
of appearance to tell members of one group from the other. Records of the Orleans Parish 
School Board, IX (1877-78) 186, unpublished, in offices of Orleans Parish School Board. 
This was not the first such difficulty at the Bayou Road school. In 1 868, before the Radical 
constitution went into effect, 28 "colored" girls who appeared white were admitted to the 
"white" school, unbeknownst to the teacher, a Mrs. Bigot. Fischer, Segregation Struggle, 
1 1 1, 138-39; Hartford (Ct.) Courant, May 29, 1 868, 3. Similarly, during the 1874 
anti-integration riots, the white mob ejected as "colored" one female student whose father 
was a leading member of the White League. New Orleans Weekly Louisianian, Feb. 13, 
1875, 1 .  
42. Eugene H. Berwanger, The Frontier Against Slavery: Western Anti-Negro Prejudice and
the Slavery Extension Controversy (Urbana, Ill.: Univ. of Ill. Press, 1967), 97-1 18;
Wilson, "Brown v. Board," 509.
23 
43. Wilson, "Brown v. Board" 509-13. Berwanger, who lavishes attention on anti-black 
sentiment in 1854 and 1 855, Frontier Against Slavery, 97-1 15, spends but three pages on 
its apparent rapid waning, which he does not attempt to explain. 
44. Proceedings and Debates in the Kansas Constitutional Convention of 1859 (reprint ed.,
Topeka, Ks.: Kansas State Printing Plant, 1920), 170--82, 191-95, 465, hereafter referred to 
as Debates, 1859. 
45. Debates, 1859, 14, 176-77.
46. The pertinent clause of the 1861 law (Kans. Laws, ch. 76, sec. 1, clause 10, p. 261) gave 
school district meetings the power "To make such order as they deem proper for the 
separate education of white and colored children, securing to them equal educational 
advantages . . .  " Article 4, section 6, p. 266 of chapter 76 bears the marks of an apparent 
compromise on its face. District schools, the law stated, were to be "equally free and 
accessible to all the children resident therein" (which might be read to prohibit excluding 
pupils from nearby schools because of race), but then added an escape clause, "subject to 
such regulations as the district board in each may prescribe" (which obviously allowed 
segregation by race, sex, and perhaps ethnicity). Unfortunately for the historian, the 
1861-65 legislative journals are not indexed, nor are bill titles infonnative, making 
following a bill's course or locating roll calls on it exceptionally difficult. 
47. On the teachers' actions, see Wilson, "Brown v. Board," 509-13. Peter Mc Vicar, Report of
Kansas Superintendent of Public Instruction (1867), 49-51 .
48. Kans. La:ws (1867) ch. 123, sec. 1, clause 10, 207; ibid., ch. 125, sec. 1, 2 1 1 .  Clyde 
Lyndon King, "The Kansas School System-Its History and Tendencies," Kansas State 
Historical Society Collections (1909-10) 1 1 , 427-28 misreads ch. 125 as a pure integration 
law. 
49. Thus in 1 869, Mc Vicar, a minister and temperance crusader, remarked: "Separate schools 
in nearly every case are bad economy, as well as a disgrace to republican institutions. If
colored persons are human, treat them as humanity deserves. Why close the school room 
against a child because he is of darker hue than his fellows? Why waste funds in 
supporting a separate school for a handful of colored children? The time will come when 
such a course will be looked on as both foolishness and barbaric injustice combined."
Mc Vicar, Report of Kansas Superintendent of Public Instruction (1870), 2-3. Similarly, 
see Mc Vicar, Report of Kansas Superintendent of Public Instruction (1869), 3-4.
50. H.B. 247 read: "Section 1. That the owners, agents, trustees or managers in charge of any 
public inn, hotel or boarding house, or any place of amusement or entertainment for which 
a license is required by any of the municipal authorities, or the owners or persons in charge 
of any stage coach, railroad or other means of public carriage for passengers or freight; or 
the members of any school board, or the directors, clerk or trustees of, or other persons in 
charge of any of the public schools within this state, who shall make any distinction on 
account of race, color, or previous condition of servitude, he or they shall be deemed guilty 
of a misdemeanor, and upon conviction thereof shall be fined in any sum not more than 
$500, and shall be liable for damages in any court of competent jurisdiction to the person 
injured thereby. 
"Sec. 2 That any acts or parts of acts that conflict with this act the same be and are 
hereby repealed." 
24 
The (Republican) Topeka Daily Commonwealth Feb. 19, 1 873, 2, remarked of the bill 
that "it is only simple justice [a phrase used repeatedly in the nineteenth century in similar 
contexts, long before Richard Kluger's book of that name on the Brown case] that is asked 
for. The freedmen are citizens now, and voters; and there is neither right nor logic in 
longer denying them the ordinary privileges of citizens merely because of their color. This 
proposed law covers the whole ground, and its adoption will but redeem a pledge of the 
[R]epublican party of Kansas to these people, and place the state on the high ground of 
equal and exact justice to all citizens. Let no [R]epublican vote against it." 
5 1 .  Topeka Daily Commonwealth, Feb. 1 8 ,  1873, 4 ;  Feb. 20, 1 873, 4 .  The repeal of the 
segregative power of second class cities was accomplished by omitting the clause of the 
1872 law that had provided the segregation power. This repeal was not accomplished by 
subterfuge, for the bill had been referred in the Senate to a special committee of all the 
Senators whose districts contained second-class cities, who amended the bill to drop the 
power to make racial distinctions. After the amended bill passed the Senate, it went to a 
joint conference committee (as many bills did) before final passage by both houses. The 
point is that representatives from Wichita, Ft. Scott, and other small cities approved the 
changes. The story may be pieced together in the Kansas House Journal (1873), 99, 105, 
508, 614, 642, 952-3; Kansas Senate Journal (1873), 406, 434, 436--7. Unfortunately, 
reports on the legislature in the Topeka Daily Commonwealth were uninformative about 
H.B. 39 and H.B. 247, explaining neither why the legislature almost unanimously reversed 
its 1 872 stand on segregation in second class cities nor why the Senate apparently did not 
consider H.B. 247. For consideration of H.B. 247 in the House, see Kansas House Journal 
(1873), 385, 387-88, 548, 941, 980--81 .  
52. The bill raised the maximum fine from $500 to $1000, and, more important, set a minimum 
fine of $10. It was not unusual in the 19th century for a jury to convict a white of a state 
civil rights law violation, but then to fine him I ¢  or some similarly nominal amount. The 
progress of the bill and a companion, S.B. 34, which appears to have been consolidated 
with H.B. l ,  may be followed in Kansas House Journal (1874), 58, 1 07-08, 280, 4 1 1 ,
662-63; Kansas Senate Journal (1874), 30, 43, 123, 163, 165, 172, 174, 198-99, 204, 313,
331 .  Scholars such as Wilson, "Brown v. Board," and Daniel Glenn Neuenswander, "A
Legal History of Segregation in the Kansas Public Schools From Statehood to 1970"
(unpub. Ed.D thesis: Univ. of Kansas, 1973), appear to have overlooked this bill entirely. 
53. See Kousser, Dead End, 42-43, n. 41 .
54. Charles Lofgren, The Plessy Case: A Legal-Historical Interpre tation (New York: Oxford 
Univ. Press, 1987), 133; Alexander M. Bickel and Benno C. Schmidt, Jr., The Judiciary 
and Responsible Government, 1910-1921 (New York: Macmillan, 1984), 757.
55. Neuenswander, "Legal History," 35; Wilson, "Brown v. Board," 513.
25 
56. Kansas House Journal (1876), 1058, 1386-89; Kansas Senate Journal (1876), 100, 307,
312, 335, 567, 694, 698-701, 822. Born in Mt. Gilead, Ohio in 1825 of abolitionist Quaker 
parents whose home was a recognized station on the underground railroad, Sam Wood
became chairman of the county's Liberty party at the age of 19 and a delegate to the 1 848
national Free Soil Convention at 23. When Kansas became the chief battleground in the 
slavery conflict, Wood moved to Lawrence to take part in the battles. A delegate to the 
Republican National Convention in 1856 and an editor of a series of Kansas newspapers 
from 1 855 on, he served in the legislature repeatedly and was speaker of the House in 1 877.
After he was shot and killed in 1891 as a result of a feud over the location of the county 
seat of Stevens county, his obituary notice called him "an extremist in everything he did"
and a black newspaper called him a "staunch friend of the negro" whose death would be 
mourned by all "Afro-American citizens of Kansas." Baxter Springs Southern Argus, July 
2, 1891,  7, 8; MargaretL. Wood, Memorial ofSamuel N. Wood (Kansas City: 
Hudson-Kimberly Publishing Co., 1892), 10-1 15.
57. Topeka Daily Commonwealth, Feb. 17, 1 876, 2. A black statewide meeting to push for
school integration was held in the legislative chamber. Ibid., Feb. 19, 1 876, 1 .  For other 
legislative actions, see ibid., Feb. 23, 1 876, l;  Feb. 27, 1 876, 2; Mar. 3, 1 876, 2.
58. It seems probable that differences of opinion in the more numerous second-class cities
prevented them from imposing segregation successfully. Lawrence and Atchison, for 
instance, always allowed blacks to attend common schools, and Wichita and Ft. Scott 
wavered. See Leavenworth Advocate, April 5, 1890, 2; February 21,  1 891 ,  2.
59. Topeka Daily Commonwealth, March 3, 1876, l ;  similarly, see Topeka 
Capital-Commonwealth, Feb. 24, 1 889, 3; March 1 ,  1889, 3.
60. Topeka Tribune, December 25, 1880, 3; Topeka Daily Commonwealth, March 2, 1881 ,  3;
Ottawa Daily Republican, March 4, 1 881 ,  1 .
61 .  Topeka American Citizen, January 25, 1 889, 4 ;  February 1 ,  1 889, 1 ,  4 ;  February 8 ,  1889,
4; February 15, 1 889, 4; February 22, 1889, 4. Kansas House Journal (1889), 442-43,
713, 1 1 87; Kansas Senate Journal (1889), 99, 153, 179, 221, 243, 263, 388, 452, 474, 475,
528, 922, 970; Cox, Blacks in Topeka, 123; Leavenworth Advocate, May 1 1 , 1 889, 2.
62. Topeka American Citizen, February 22, 1 889, 4, said the Topeka Board of Education had
threatened to fire every black teacher if the integration bill passed. One prominent black 
teacher in Topeka lobbied the legislative to preserve segregation (and his job, since teacher 
integration was much more controversial among whites than student integration was). See 
Leavenworth Advocate, February 7, 1891, 2, 3; February 14, 1 891,  3; February 21,  1891,
2. Topeka American Citizen, March 15, 1889, I ,  charged that the general education bill
was torpedoed not over taxes, but through covert action by men from Topeka and 
Leavenworth, who acted out of antipathy to integration. 
63. Cox, Blacks in Topeka, 167.
64. Blanc F. Joubert v. Sacred Heart Academy (unpublished) case #21761, 6th District, 
Orleans Parish, in Orleans Parish Public Library. I happened on a reference to this case,
heretofore unmentioned by Louisiana historians, in the Hariford (Connecticut) Times, May 
2, 1 868, 3. The 1 868 state constitution was ratified April 17. Joe Gray Taylor, Louisiana
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Reconstructed, 1863-1877 (Baton Rouge, La.: Louisiana State Univ. Press, 1974), 158. 
The Fourteenth Amendment to the federal constitution went into effect on July 28. Alfred 
H. Kelly and Winfred A. Harbison, The American Constitution: Its Origins and 
Development (5th ed. New York: W. W. Norton, 1976), 1066, 
65. Joubert was a member of the Republican state central committee from at least 1878 through 
1880, and probably earlier. See New Orleans Republican, October 2, 1878, l ;  New
Orleans Louisianian, October 25, 1 879, 2; March 20, 1880, 3 .  Educated in France, 
Joubert was a member of the New Orleans Common Council during the Civil War, the first 
man of color to hold a judicial position in the south, presidential elector on the Grant ticket 
in 1868, and a federal office holder. San Francisco Elevator, May 7, 1869, 1 .  Born free, 
he was a "gentleman of handsome fortune . . .  so nearly white that one could scarcely take 
him to be colored," and, allegedly, a slaveholder before the War. Cleveland Gazette, 
September 22, 1883.
66. Article 13 of the Radical Constitution, adopted March 13, 1868, stated: "All persons shall 
enjoy equal rights and privileges upon any conveyance of a public character; and all places 
of business, or of public resort, or for which a license is required by either State, parish, or 
municipal authority, shall be deemed places of public character, and shall be opened to the 
accomodation and patronage of all persons, without distinction or discrimination on 
account of race or color." Thorpe, Federal and State Constitutions, III, 1450. Joubert's
petition was filed at an unspecified date in April. The judgment was rendered on April 28.
On Field, see Taylor, Louisiana Reconstructed, 55; New Orleans Republican, August 20, 
1876, 5 .
67. Duplanti er was vice president of the parish Republican central committee in 1867. See 
Buffalo (N. Y.) Commercial Advertiser, January 12, 1867, I .  Other than the fact that his 
family had been in Louisiana for at least two generations, I have been able to learn very 
little about Duplantier. 
68. Among the tactics blacks used against the 1 875 movement to resegregate the schools was a 
threat to expose the "mixed" ancestry of older citizens who were now considered "white."
See New Orleans Louisianian, September 18, 1875, 2. In "Beyond the Realm of Social 
Consensus: New Meanings of Reconstruction for American History," Journal of American 
History, 68 (1981), 294, Armistead L. Robinson elevates evanescent tactical differences 
into enduring class-based factional alignments within the New Orleans black community. 
The closer one looks, however, the less clear any such divisions seem. The partisan course 
of the leading black politician in New Orleans, P.B.S. Pinchback, for instance, shifted 
repeatedly, but he remained committed to integration. He and other members of the 
so-called "colored aristocracy" correctly predicted how the Democrats would treat Jim 
Crow schools, and they did everything they could to prevent it. Their struggle deserves 
more respect, and divisions within the black community, less attention than they sometimes 
get. 
69. On "Redemption," see Taylor, Louisiana Reconstructed, 480-505. On Pinchback, see 
Charles Vincent, "Louisiana's Black Governor: Aspects of His National Significance,"
Negro History Bulletin 42 (1979) 34; Emma Lou Thornbrough, "Pickney Benton Stewart 
Pinchback," in Rayford W. Logan and Michael R. Winston, Dictionary of American Negro
Biography (New York: Norton, 1982), 493; William Simmons, Men of Mark: Eminent,
Progressive and Rising (1 887, reprint ed., New York: Amo Press, 1968), 759-75. On the 
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failure of black efforts to sustain integration by tactical compromises with the Redeemers, 
see Harris, Story of Public Education, 58; Rodolphe Lucien Desdunes, Our People and 
Our History, Sr. Dorothea 0. McCants, ed., & trans., (reprint ed., Baton Rouge, La.: 
Louisiana State Univ. Press, 1973), 135-38; New Orleans Louisianian, Sept. 29, 1 877, 2; 
New Orleans Daily Picayune, June 27, 1877, 1, July 4, 1 877, 8. 
70. When blacks held a meeting to collect contributions to finance the Trevigne case­
Pinchback contributed the sizable sum of $50--the New Orleans Daily Picayune, 
September 28, 1 877, 1 ,  accused them of a desire "to make a political issue out of the 
question." Of course, the Democrats never considered turning the school integration issue 
to political purposes. 
71 .  Born free in 1 824, son of a veteran of the Battle of New Orleans, Trevigne was a n  active 
politician, serving on the Republican state committee in 1867 and in a steady federal
patronage job from at least 1880 through 1884. Author of the first historical sketch of
blacks in Louisiana, he wrote for four successive black newspapers in New Orleans and
was very active in the struggle to overturn the Jim Crow railroad law in the 1890s, a six­
year campaign doomed to lead to Plessy. The ever temperate New Orleans Democrat, 
Sept. 28, 1877, 4, termed Trevigne's suit an effort to gain "cheap notoriety" by a "haughty 
descendent of Ham," whose attempt to substitute "African supremacy" for "civilization and
christianity" endangered any white support for the education of " African ignorance and
savagery." The constitution, this organ of "conservatism" asserted, "is not binding."On
Trevigne, see Edward Larocque Tinker, Les Ecrits De Langue Franr;aise En Louisiane Aux 
XIX Siecle (Paris: Librarie Ancienne Honore Champion, 1932), 475; William P.
O'Connor, "Reconstruction Rebels: The New Orleans Tribune in Post-War Louisiana,"
Louisiana History 21 (1980) 159; Vincent, Black Legislators, 24; Dorothea Olga Mccants,
"Paul Trevigne," in Logan and Winston, American Negro Biography, 601-02; Everett,
"Free Negro," 241, 330, 362, 364; Records of the Orleans Parish School Board, VIII 
(1876-77), 151 ,  159, in Orleans parish school board offices; Otto H. Olsen, ed., The Thin 
Disguise: Turning Point in Negro History: Plessy v. Ferguson: A Documentary 
Presentation, 1864-1896 (New York: Humanities Press, 1967), 47-67; Jean-Charles
Houzeau, My Passage at the New Orleans Tribune, David C. Rankin, ed.,(Baton Rouge,
La.:Louisiana State Univ. Press, 1984), 71, n. 6. On the replacement of Republicans with
Democrats, see New Orleans Daily Picayune, April 6, 1 877, 8.
72. Trevigne v. Board of Education of Orleans Parish (unpublished) case #9545, in Orleans
Parish Public Library, hereafter referred to as Trevigne Case File. A briefer form of the
petition appeared in New Orleans Democrat, September 27, 1877, 8. Among the three
men who guaranteed the $1000 bond that had to be filed in order to bring the case was
Blanc F. Joubert.
73. It is worth noting that Trevigne 's counsel did not raise equal protection or due process
claims, presumably because they believed that even after the Supreme Court's decision in
Slaughter-House [16 Wall. 36 (1873)], the privileges or immunities clause retained
considerable vigor. Of course, raising issues of the national constitution before a state
court in which they must have known that they would probably lose indicates an intention
to appeal an adverse judgment to the federal courts.
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74. Obviously patterned partly on the Fourteenth Amendment, Article 2 stated: "All persons,
without regard to race, color, or previous condition, born or naturalized in the United
States, and subject to the jurisdiction thereof, and residents of this state for one year, are
citizens of this state. . . . They shall enjoy the same civil, political, and public rights and
privileges, and be subject to the same pains and penalties." Thorpe, Federal and State
Constitutions, III, 1449.
75. Belden was surely aware of the U. S. Supreme Court's decision in Slaughter-House, for as 
state attorney general, he had argued one of the three cases later consolidated under the 
name Slaughter-House in the state court. Charles Fairman, Reconstruction and Reunion,
1864-88 (New York: Macmillan, 1971), 1326. Perhaps he ignored Justice Samuel Miller's
ruling that the rights Americans claimed as national citizens were ludicrously limited, 
while those they enjoyed as state citizens were not protected under the privileges or
immunities clause because he hoped that 5-4 decision might be reversed by the time it
considered Trevigne, if the case were appealed that far. Or perhaps he hoped that the Court
might give the clause a more expansive reading if black rights were involved, as Miller's
"one pervading purpose" language might lead one to believe. Slaughter-House Cases, 1 6
Wall. 36, 74 (1873). 
76. Blacks used the same argument in less formal contexts. Trevigne and the Tribune editors 
declared that they favored the 1869 state civil rights bill not so much because they wished
to attend the opera or saloon with whites, or even because they wanted to be able to ride on
streetcars, boats, and trains freely, but because "under the present order of things our
manhood is sacrificed . . .  the broad stamp of inferiority is put upon us." New Orleans
Tribune, Feb. 7, 1 869, quoted in Philip M. Mabe, "Racial Ideology In the New Orleans
Press, 1 862-1877" (unpub. Ph.D. thesis: Univ. of Southwestern Louisiana, 1977), 1 31-2.
77. Trevigne's lawyers also speculated that segregation would cause the school board to violate 
article 1 1 8  of the 1868 constitution, which provided that "Taxation shall be equal and 
uniform throughout the State." Thorpe, Federal and State Constitutions, III, 1464. Their
reasoning was that segregated schools would cost more and therefore require either unequal 
tax rates from parish to parish or "the closing of the avenues of [e]ducation to [p]etitioner's 
[s]on and the entire colored population . . . .  " Unwieldy as a legal argument, it was all too 
accurate as a factual prediction. Trevigne Case File. 
78. Born in Kentucky and raised in Quincy, Illinois, Jonas moved to Louisiana in 1853. Like 
his father, who had served in the legislatures of both Kentucky and Illinois, B. F. Jonas 
became a Whig politician. Although a prominent Unionist in 1 860, he went with the 
Confederacy, serving throughout the War as a lowly private. Unlike his fellow Whig John 
Ray, Jonas became a Democrat in 1865, serving in the legislature, 1 865-68, and being
nominated by the Democrats for Lieutenant Governor in 1 872. The city attorney of New
Orleans, 1 874-78, he was simultaneously the Democratic floor leader in the legislative in
1877. After a term in the U. S. Senate, he was appointed Collector of the Port of New
Orleans. A longtime member of the Democratic state committee, he was a prominent 
leader of the White League revolt in September, 1 874. He became law partner of E. H. 
Farrar in 1 887. Biographical Memoirs, 201-02, 495-98; Alcee Fortier, Louisiana
(Atlanta: Southern Historical Assn., 1909), 627-28. Long actively involved in the school
segregation campaign, Jonas had at a white mass meeting in 1 870 promised violence if 
school integration took place. See New Orleans Daily Picayune, February 13,  1 870, at 1.
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79. A native Louisianian born in 1849, Farrar graduated from the University of Virginia and
practiced law in Louisiana from 1872 on. He was elected New Orleans city attorney in
1880, and subsequently served as president of the American Bar Association. An anti­
lottery, Gold Democratic "reformer," he framed the article on taxation in the 1913 state
constitutional convention. Biographical Memoirs, 481-82; New Orleans Times-Picayune, 
January 7, 1922, 1 ,  3.
80. Trevigne Case File. Farrar tendered his services free to the cause of white supremacy, 
Records of the Orleans Parish School Board, IX (1876--77), 1 10, 1 13, in Orleans parish 
school board offices.
8 1 .  Because of infighting o n  the Orleans parish school board, the public schools did not open 
for the fall until October 22, 1877. New Orleans Daily Picayune, October 23, 1877, 1 .  
82. Born in Louisiana, Rightor, though a Catholic, attended Wesleyan College in Connecticut
before returning south to practice law. A Colonel in the Confederacy, Rightor, in the
biased phrases of the New Orleans Daily Picayune, August 12, 1900, " was among the first
to take up arms for the liberation of the state from radical rule, and was in command of one 
of the companies of the White League on the memorable 14th of September [1874]." On 
that date, the White Leaguers' attempted coup d'etat against the state government had to be 
put down by federal troops. For his efforts, he was appointed judge in 1877. See also New 
Orleans Daily States, August 12, 1900; New Orleans Times-Democrat, August 12, 1900.
83. Rightor's opinion is printed in full in the New Orleans Daily Picayune, October 24, 1877,
2.
84. The opinion of the court, in manuscript, is in the files of the Louisiana Supreme Court in
New Orleans. Paul Trevigne v. School Board and William 0. Rogers, case #6832 (1879).
It appears to have escaped the attention of previous historians.
85. De Blanc, a native Louisianian, was a Confederate officer and "one of the leading spirits in
the organization of the White League . . . .  " Fortier, Louisiana, 339. The other justices
were Thomas Courtland Manning, a member of the state secession convention and
Confederate General, and "the highest type of the lordly Anglo-Saxon . . .  "; Robert H.
Marr, another leading White Leaguer; William B. Spencer, a plantation-born Confederate
captain and Democratic Congressman; and William B. Egan. Ibid., 93, 487; Lamar C.
Quintero, "The Supreme Court of Louisiana," The Green Bag, 3 (1891) 1 13; National
Cyclopedia of American Biography, IV, 344; Biographical Directory of the American
Congress, 1789-1971 (Washington, D.C.: G.P.O., 1971), 1736.
86. On the merging of the two "extraordinary remedies," see J. Morgan Kousser, "Separate But
Not Equal: The Supreme Court's First Decision on Racial Discrimination in Schools,"
Journal of Southern History 46 (1980), 29-30.
87. State of Louisiana ex rel. Josephine Harper v. Mrs. M. A. Wickes, Principal of the Live Oak 
School, 6th District Court, Orleans parish, case file in Orleans Parish Public Library, asked
for a mandamus to compel Mrs. Wickes to admit Frances and Mary Ardene Harper and
Josephine Harper's niece, Ida Sawler, who lived with them. The girls had first been
admitted to the school, then ejected solely on account of color. Although a hearing was set
for later in November, 1877 before Judge Rightor, there is no evidence in the case file or
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the newspapers that the case went any farther. The petition, which is summarized in New 
Orleans Daily Picayune, Nov. 1 1 ,  1 877, 2, does not mention the constitutional or statutory 
grounds of the suit. 
88. These developments may be followed in New Orleans Daily Picayune, Nov. 10, 1 877, l ;
Nov. 13 ,  1 877, 2 ;  Jan. 15,  1878, 2; Jan. 29, 1878, 3 ;  Feb. 19, 1878, 3 .  The case files are 
in the Louisiana Supreme Court, New Orleans, case #7500 (1881), hereafter referred to as 
Dellande Case File. Less prominent than Isabelle, Joubert, Trevigne, or Bertonneau, 
Dellande was a cigar manufacturer who owned $9000 worth of property in 1879, according 
to the New Orleans City Directories for the period and case no. 10763, 6th District Court, 
Orleans parish (1879) in Orleans Parish Public Library. I find no mention of him or of Mrs.
Harper in the newspapers of the time, except in connection with their court cases.
89. Josephine Decuir v. John G. Benson, 27 La. Ann. 1 (1875); C. S. Sauvinet v. Joseph A.
Walker, 27 La. Ann. 14 (1875); Washington, Alexandria, & Georgetown Railroad Co. v.
Brown, 17 How. 445 (1873). In the lower court, Judge Henry Dibble awarded black sheriff 
C. S. Sauvinet $1000 damages under the state's  1869 civil rights law and articles 2 and 13
of the 1868 constitution. Fischer, Segregation Struggle, 69-70. Mrs. Decuir was awarded 
a like sum when the owner of a steamboat denied her first-class accommodations as she 
was travelling from New Orleans to her upcountry plantation. The 
then-Republican-dominated state supreme court upheld both verdicts, though the U.S.
Supreme Court overturned Decuir [Hall v. DeCuir, 95 U.S. 547 (1878)] on interstate 
commerce grounds a month before Dellande was filed. The fact that Jones and Farrar did 
not even bother to mention this reversal or to cite Justice Nathan Clifford's concurrence, in 
which this last Buchanan appointee on the Court argued that segregation was constitutional, 
indicates how little attention they paid to constitutional issues. The Brown case ruled that 
separate but equal violated the federal charter granted to the railroad, but Justice David
Davis's language was more expansive than the bare ruling implies.
90. The local court decision was printed in full in New Orleans Daily Picayune, May 21,  1878,
1 .  
91.  Dellande Case File. In an attempt to demonstrate the arbitrariness of the caste system in 
Louisiana, Belden asked Dellande during the trial whether it could "be ascertained that 
your children are colored, by their appearance, without being told?" Dellande replied: 
"No-The children are as white in color as anybody." In his lower court opinion, Rightor 
briefly toyed with the idea of denying Dellande standing to sue, because, the judge 
remarked, he "does not belong exclusively to any separate race . . .  " It would have been 
interesting to watch the judge's contortions ifhe had ruled that Dellande was "colored" for 
the purposes of the schools, but not for the purposes of the courts. 
92. State ex rel. U. Dellande v. New Orleans School Board, 13 La. Ann. 1469 (1881).
93. Thorpe, Federal and State Constitutions, III, p. 1508, art. 224. It was not until the 
disfranchising convention of 1898 that the state constitution mentioned school segregation. 
Ibid., III, p. 1575, art. 248.
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94. Biographical Memoirs, 3 14-16. His "one object" during Reconstruction, this biographical 
sketch asserts, was to "starve out" the Republicans in his home parish, and he also attended 
all the state and national Democratic conventions during the era and canvassed
southwestern Louisiana extensively. Poche was one of the founders of the American Bar
Association. Other justices were Edward E. Bermudez, a "cooperationist" member of the 
Louisiana secession convention and Confederate soldier who was removed from local 
office in 1867 as "an impediment to Reconstruction"; Charles E. Fenner, another active 
secessionist, a Confederate major, and leader in the effort to unseat the state's  Republican
governor in 1876--77; William M. Levy, a native of Virginia, Confederate, and
Congressman; and Robert B. Todd. Fortier, Louisiana, 65, 84; Quintero, "Louisiana
Supreme Court," 1 13-38; Dictionary of American Biography, II, ( 1929), 220, 323.
95. Italics supplied. The handwritten opinion is in Dellande Case File. 
96. New Orleans Daily Picayune, Dec. 23, 1 877, 4.
97. Bertonneau's children were denied entry to the Fillmore school (the same school to which 
Dellande applied) on Nov. 13, 1878, three days after the Dellande case was filed. 
Bertonneau was filed on Nov. 28. See the case file of Arnold B ertonneau v. B oard of 
Directors of the City Schools, case #8306, Fifth Circuit and District of Louisiana, in
Federal Records Center, Fort Worth, Texas, R.G. 21,  Eastern District, Louisiana, New 
Orleans Division, General Records, Case Files, 1837-1911 ,  hereafter referred to as 
Bertonneau Case File. 
98. A member of both houses of the Louisiana legislature in the prewar era, twice Whig 
nominee for Lieutenant Governor on tickets during the 1 850s, elected to the U.S. House in 
1865 and the Senate in 1873 (though not seated by Congress), the man who singlehandedly 
codified the laws of the state during Reconstruction, Ray deserves more favorable mention 
than he has gotten from the state's historians. For instance, the leading historian of
Louisiana Reconstruction, Joe Gray Taylor, omits Ray, as well as the other Louisiana- and 
border state-born white Republican lawyers in the other school segregation cases, from a
list of the only three whites in the state at the time "who seem honestly to have believed 
that all men were created equal." Taylor does not enunciate a criterion for determining 
subjective honesty, and he mistakenly lists Paul Trevigne as one of the three whites. See
Joe Gray Taylor, "Louisiana-An Impossible Task," in Otto H. Olsen, ed., Reconstruction
and R edemption in the South (Baton Rouge, La.: Louisiana State Univ. Press, 1980), 222.
A Unionist during the War, Ray attracted national attention as counsel to the Republican 
state returning board in 1876--77, the actions of which allowed Rutherford B. Hayes to 
become president. Although allegedly involved in certain shady deals himself, he served as 
a competent special prosecutor in the "Whiskey Ring" cases, which involved corrupt 
actions by government officials. Assessed for $70,000 worth of property in 1870, and said
to have a "thriving law practice" in New Orleans after 1877, Ray almost certainly did not
take on Bertonneau because he needed the fee. In view of the facts that as state senator in 
1868, he had been the floor manager of the Fourteenth Amendment and had voted for state 
integration laws, and that during the 1870s, he was a member of the "Louisiana Club," a
largely black social and political group, it seems likely that Ray represented Bertonneau 
because he believed in racial equality. Biographical sources on Ray include James G.
Wilson and John Fiske, eds., Appleton' s Cyclopedia of American Biography, V ( 1888),
192; Wetta, "Louisiana Scalawags," 80-82, 354-55; Wetta, "'Bulldozing the Scalawags':
Some Examples of the Persecution of Southern White Republicans in Louisiana During 
32 
Reconstruction," Louisiana History 21 (1980) 53--54; Louisiana Senate Journal (1868), 
13, 21 ,  1 83-84; (1869), 98; (1870), 290; Joe Gray Taylor, Louisiana Reconstructed, 194, 
197-98; New York Herald, Feb. 14, 1 873, 5, Mar. 27, 1 873, 7; New Orleans Daily 
Picayune, Aug. 2, 1 877; Jan 23, 27, 28, Feb. 8, 1 878; Herringshaw' s Encyclopedia of 
American Biography of the 19th Century (1 898), 773; New Orleans Louisianian, Nov. 2, 
1872, l , Jan. 30, 1 875, 
3. The Topeka Daily Commonwealth, Jan. 23, 1873, 2, called Ray "a prudent and able 
legislator" whose "private character is irreproachable." 
99. Son of a French-born father and a Cuban mother, Bertonneau was light enough to have 
been termed "white" in the 1 880 census and on his death certificate in Pasadena, California, 
where he moved and "passed" sometime between 1 890 and 1912. Owner of $ 1800 worth 
of real estate in the 1 879 city tax records, he worked at a variety of jobs - wine merchant, 
cigar store owner, dry goods store owner, and U.S. customs employee. An officer in the 
Native Guards during the War, he carried a petition for black suffrage to President Lincoln 
in 1 864 and was afterwards feted in Boston at a public dinner hosted by Massachusetts 
governor John A. Andrew and attended by William Lloyd Garrison, Wendell Phillips, and 
Frederick Douglass. Responding to a toast at that meeting, Bertonneau promised to carry 
the message that Boston blacks enjoyed integration in streetcars and schools back to 
Louisiana, which he did as a member of the 1868 state constitutional convention. David 
Rankin, "The Impact of the Civil War on the Free Colored Community of New Orleans,"
Perspectives in American History 1 1  (1977-78) 400 ; McCrary, Lincoln and 
Reconstruction, 256; James M. McPherson, The Negro' s Civil War (New York: Vintage 
Books, 1965), 278-280; New Orleans Louisianian, Oct. 25, 1 879, 1 ,  4,  Mar. 20, 1 880, 3;
Desdunes, Our People, 131 ;  Everett, "Free Negro," 362, 364, 379; Washington (D.C.)
People's Advocate, Feb. 1 8, 1882, I. I want to thank David C. Rankin for sending me
Bertonneau's death certificate. 
1 00. Ray also charged a violation of section 1979, U.S. Revised Statutes, which read in pertinent 
part: "Every person who under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage 
of any state or territory, subjects or causes to be subjected any citizen of the United States 
or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or 
immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an 
action at law, suit in chancery, or other proper proceeding for redress." He also contended 
that the action violated section 1977 (the 1866 Civil Rights Bill, reenacted in 1870, after 
the passage of the Fourteenth Amendment, to clear up any doubts about its 
constitutionality): "All persons within the jurisdiction of the United States shall have the 
same right in every state and Territory . . .  to the full and equal benefit of all laws and 
provisions for the security of persons and property as is enjoyed by white citizens . " 
Quoted in original complaint and supplementary briefs, Bertonneau Case File. 
101. Ibid. 
102. Ibid. They even failed to point out the "good faith" that the school board had so 
ostentatiously paraded in its segregation resolution: "Whereas this Board in the 
performance of its paramount duty which is to give the best education possible within the 
means at its disposal to the whole population without regard to race color or previous 
condition is assured that this end can be best attained by educating the different races in 
separate schools." Ibid. 
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103. Dred Scott v. Sandford, 19 How. 393 (1857). Ray replied to the jurisdictional point by 
citing an Act of Congress dated March 3, 1 875, ch. 137, p. 470, which provided for federal 
court jurisdiction, "concurrent with the courts of the several states, of all suits of a civil 
nature at common law or in equity when the matter in dispute exceeds, exclusive of costs, 
the sum or value of $500, and arising under the Constitution or laws of the United States . .  
. . . . " Supplementary briefs, in Bertonneau Case File. 
104. Bertonneau v. New Orleans, 3 Fed. Cas. 294 (1878), hereafter referred as Bertonneau. 
105. Louis Filler, "William B. Woods," in Friedman and Israel, Justices of the U.S. Supreme 
Court, II, 1327; Harold Chase et al., Biographical Dictionary of the Federal Judiciary 
(Detroit: Gale Research Co., 1976), 309; Whitelaw Reid, Ohio in the War 
(Cincinnati: Moore, Wilstach, & Baldwin, 1868) I, 863-64; Cincinnati Commercial, Dec. 
23, 1 880, 5; Dec. 24, 1 880, 1 ;  Dec. 31,  1880, 4. 
106. Bertonneau, 296. 
107. Workman v. Detroit, 1 8  Mich. 400 (1869), Clark v. Muscatine, 24 Iowa 266 ( 1868); 
Garnes v. McCann, 21 Oh. State 198 (1871), Hall v. DeCuir, 95 U.S. 485 (1878). Woods 
also cited Stoutmeyer v. Duffy, 7 Nev. 342 (1872), in which, as in Garnes and Hall, judges 
had gone well out of their way to declare segregation constitutional under the Fourteenth 
Amendment. A strict construction of each opinion would have treated the approbations of 
segregation as dicta. On Clifford, see the excellent sketch by William Gillette in Friedman 
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